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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JOYCE

v.

TOWN OF TEWKSBURY:

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S PROTECTION OF LIBERTY AND PRI
VACY VERSUS QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
secures the people's right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. 1 The United States Supreme Court has stated that
"'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."'2 Generally, any
search or seizure conducted without a valid warrant is unconstitu
tional,3 although there are certain well-recognized exceptions. 4
1. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shaH issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CaNST. amend. IV.
2. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972»._
3. See infra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the warrant requirement.
4. A search or seizure may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even
where law enforcement officers do not possess a warrant, provided that it is supported
by probable. cause. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991) (holding
that a warrant is not necessary to search an automobile when there is probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contains contraband); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37
(1990) (adopting the rule that officers may seize items in "plain view" without a search
warrant); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38,43 (1976) (holding that when sufficient
exigent circumstances are present to justify entry into a home, a warrant is not a requi
site); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427 (1976) (holding that no arrest warrant
is required to arrest a suspect when the suspect is in public); Schneckloth v. Bus
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218,226-27 (1973) (holding that where consent is voluntarily given
a court determines voluntariness by weighing the totality of the circumstances-a
search without a warrant is constitutional); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969) (holding that no search warrant is necessary for a "search incident to arrest");
United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 1984) (following Chimel and
holding that a search incident to arrest is an exception to the warrant requirement);
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Perhaps the most notable of these exceptions is what the Supreme
Court has termed "exigent circumstances."5 Absent a showing of
exigency or consent,6 the police officer must obtain a warrant from
a neutral magistrate who determines whether there is sufficient
probable cause.?
Where, however, police conduct a search or arrest of an indi
vidual without a warrant in circumstances that do not fall under one
of the recognized exceptions,S an individual may claim that the po
lice have violated his Fourth Amendment rights. To remedy the
harm of such a Fourth Amendment violation, the individual may
United States v. Blalock, 578 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that no warrant is
necessary to arrest a suspect in the suspect's business establishment during business
hours).
5. Generally, exigent circumstances exist where there is an emergency situation
justifying police action without a warrant. See generally Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S.
91,100 (1990) (discussing several examples of exigent circumstances). Exigent circum~
stances include the following: (1) "hot pursuit of a fleeing felon," (2) "imminent de
struction of evidence," (3) "the need to prevent a suspect's escape," and (4) "the risk of
danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling." Id. (citations
omitted); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (holding that an exigency
may have existed to investigate a bullet fired through an apartment floor); Michigan v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (holding that a burning building creates an exigency);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that police officers may enter a
dwelling to search for a suspected felon and his weapons within minutes of a robbery
because "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the
course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of
others. Speed here was essential ...").
Courts determine whether sufficient exigent circumstances exist on a case-by-case
basis. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 100 (stating that the court may employ a "fact-specific
application of the proper legal standard" to determine whether exigent circumstances
exist); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,761 (1984) (White, I., dissenting) (rec
ognizing that the majority's holding that courts should consider the gravity of the of
fense when determining if exigent circumstances exist will necessitate a case-by-case
analysis). However, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that sufficient exigent
circumstances exist to warrant the intrusion. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 (stating that
"the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome
the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries"); H.
Patrick Furman, The Exigent Circumstances Exception to the Warrant Requirement, ZO
COLO. LAW. 1167, 1167 (1991) (stating that "[t]he prosecution bears the burden of es
tablishing probable cause ... [and] exigent circumstances").
6. See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27 (holding that where consent is volun
tarily given-a court determines voluntariness by weighing the totality of the circum
stances-a search without a warrant is constitutional).
7. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 576. For a discussion of the warrant process, see infra
Part I.A.2. For a discussion of probable cause, see infra note 54 and accompanying text.
There are other instances in which an arrest is lawful notwithstanding the absence of an
exigency or consent. See supra note 4 for a description of several of these exceptions.
8. See supra notes 4-5 for descriptions and examples of certain exceptions, includ
ing exigent circumstances, to the warrant requirement.
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bring a civil action under 42 U.S.c. § 1983. 9 Section 1983 provides
a federal cause of action against state officials for deprivations of
constitutional or federal statutory rights. lO The purposes are two,.
fold. First, § 1983 discourages state officials from using the "badge
of their authority" to deprive individuals of federal·constitutional
and statutory rights.1 1 Second, the statute provides individuals with
a remedy where § 1983 does not succeed in discouraging such dep
rivations of federal statutory or constitutional rights.12 State offi
cials can, however, avoid § 1983 liability with .a number of
defenses. 13
The most common method for public officials to avoid liability
under § 1983 is to claim a defense of qualified immunity.14 Quali
fied immunity is an affirmative defense, which shelters public offi
9. Section 1983 permits an individual to bring a cause of action against officials
acting "under color of state law" when an official's conduct violates federally protected
constitutional or statutory rights. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1994). See generally Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (permitting suit against state actors for vioiations of federal
or statutory rights); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (same).
10. See 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Section 1983 provides, in rele
vant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Territory ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United Sta.tes ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Id. See infra Part l.C.l for further a discussion of § 1983.
11. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
12. See id.
13. See Stephen J. Shapiro, Public Official's Qualified Immuhity in Section 1983
Actions Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and its Progeny: A Critical Analysis, 22 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 249, 250-51 (1989) (stating that "proof of a constitutional violation alone
does not render a government official liable," because judges and prosecutors may be
absolutely immune and most other state officials may be qualifiedly immune from suit).
A common defense, other than qualified immunity, is absolute imrilunity, which is af
forded to judges and prosecutors. See id.
14. See Gary S. Gilden, Immunizing Intentional Violations Of Constitutional
Rights Through Judicial Legislation: The Extension of Harlow v. Fitzgerald to Section
1983 Actions, 38 EMORY L.J. 369, 369 (1989) (stating that "the Supreme Court and the
federal courts of appeals have uniformly extended [qualified immunity] to civil actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983"); see also Shapiro, supra note 13, at 251 (stating that
the Supreme Court has created several types of immunity, and that most governmental
employees receive qualified immunity); A. Allise Burris, Qualifying Immunity in Sec
tion 1983 & Bivens Actions, 71 TEX. L. REv. 123, 125, 160-68 (1992) (discussing quali
fied immunity in § 1983 actions); William Hawkins, Note, Section 1983: A Basic
Understanding, 12 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc. 355, 363-65 (1988) (providing a brief but
thoughtful discussion of qualified immunity in § 1983 actions).
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cials from civil liability for violations of constitutional or statutory
rights,15 In order for an official to prevail on his defense of quali
fied immunity, the official must show that the law that he allegedly
violated was not "clearly established" at the time of the alleged mis
. conduct.1 6 The primary purpose of quaHfied immunity is to enable
public officials to perform their duties without the interruption of
potentially "harassing litigation. "17
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ad
dressed the defense of qualified immunity in the context of the
Fourth Amendment and § 1983 in Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury .18 In
Joyce, police officers entered the Joyces' home, without a search
warrant, to execute an outstanding arrest warrant for the Joyces'
son, Lance Joyce, who did not reside in that house. 19 Jo;mne and
James Joyce brought suit against the two officers20 under 42 U.S.c.
15. See generally Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 512 (1994); Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982); see
also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 752 (6th ed. 1990) (defining qualified immunity as ·an
"[a]ffirmative defense which shields public officials performing discretionary functions
from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which [a] reasonable person would have known"). See infra
Part I.C.2 for further discussion of the doctrine of qualified immunity.
16. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (defining
"clearly established" as those rights where "[t]he contours of the right [are so] suffi
ciently clear that a reasonable official would understand" that his conduct violates that
established right); Pinder v. Comm'rs of Cambridge, 821 F. Supp. 376, 398 (D. Md.
1993) (holding that the inquiry into whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity
"requires a review of (1) the identification of the specific right allegedly violated; (2)
determining whether or not at the time of the alleged violation, the right was 'clearly
established'; and (3) whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have
known that [his conduct] would violate that right"), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d
1169 (4th Cir. 1995). See infra Part I.C.2 for further discussion of qualified immunity.
17. See Mark R. Brown, Correlating Municipal Liability and Official Immunity
Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 625, 670 (1989) ("The rationale for qualified
immunity is that ... an official must be allowed to act undeterred by potential harassing
litigation."); see also Elder, 510 U.S. at 514; Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992)
("Qualified immunity strikes a balance between compensating those who have been
injured by official conduct and protecting government's ability to perform its traditional
functions."); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638 ("[P]ermitting damages suits against govern
ment officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal
monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of
their duties."); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (stating that immunity was
justified, in part, to preserve the "public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of
official authority"); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (recognizing that qualified
immunity permits officials to perform their duties in a "principled and fearless"
manner).
18. 112 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 1997).
19. See id. at 20.
20. The Joyces originally brought suit against the Town of Tewksbury, the chief of

1999]FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF LIBERTY AND PRNACY 517

§ 1983,21 alleging that the officers violated their Fourth Amend

ment rights by entering their home without a search warrant.22 The
court addressed the following issue: whether police officers' entry
into a third party's home without a search warrant to arrest a sus
pect for whom they have an arrest warrant violates "clearly estab
lished" Fourth Amendment rights of which a reasonable officer
would have known at the time of the entry.23 Rather than deciding
the issue on Fourth Amendment grounds, however, the First Circuit
held that the officers were protected under the doctrine of qualified
immunity.24 The dissent argued that the majority's use of qualified
immunity was incorrect because the police officers' conduct
presented a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment. 25
This Note addresses the issue of whether the First Circuit erred
police, and the individual officers. See id. at 21. However, on appeal to the First Cir
cuit, the only remaining claim was that of the officers' alleged illegal entry. See id.
21. See supra note 10 for the text of § 1983. The purpose of the statute "is to
deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their
federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails."
Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161.
22. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 21. The Joyces also claimed that the police violated
their Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force against Joanne Joyce when
attempting to arrest Lance. See id. When the officers attempted to arrest Lance after
entry into the house, Joanne Joyce tried to interrupt their efforts by getting in the way.
See id. The officers then grabbed Joanne Joyce by the upper arms and physically moved
her out of the way. See id. This action, if found to constitute excessive force, consti
tutes a Fourth Amendment violation because it is essentially an unreasonable seizure.
See, e.g., Jones v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456, 1460-61 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that
although the plaintiff alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment rights because the
arresting officer used excessive force, "the actual force used and the injury inflicted
were both minor in nature"). The Joyces' § 1983 claim also alleged violations of their
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 21. How
ever, the Fourth Amendment claim of illegal entry to arrest was the only issue remain
ing on appeal. See id.
23. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 20. A panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals af
firmed an order of the District Court of Massachusetts granting the defendants' motion
for summary judgment. See id. at 21.
24. See id. at 23. The court noted that "[t)here is some cost in not deciding the
Fourth Amendment issue on the merits. . . . But the en banc court is agreed that
qualified immunity applies, and there is less consensus about the underlying constitu
tional issue." [d. See infra Part 1.C.2 for a more detailed discussion of the doctrine of
qualified inlmunity, and infra Part III.B for a discussion of qualified inlmunity's rela
tionship to the holding in Joyce.
25. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 25-26 (Selya, J., dissenting). Specifically, Judge Selya,
writing for the dissent, believed that the officers' entry was unconstitutional under the
case of Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 205-06, 213-14 (1981), which held that
police officers may not enter a third party's home without a search warrant except
where exigent circumstances are present or the third party consents to the entry. See
Joyce, 112 F.3d at 26 (Selya, J., dissenting). See infra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of
Steagald.
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in granting the police officers in Joyce qualified immunity under the
particular facts of that case. Part I of this Note provides a brief
overview of the Fourth Amendment, discussing its origins and sub
sequent ratification.26 This Part also discusses the warrant require
ment contained in the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment,
the process utilized in obtaining a warrant, and the distinctions be
tween arrest warrants and search warrantsP Part I further exam
ines United States Supreme Court decisions concerning how arrest
warrants, search warrants and exigent circumstances impact arrests
occurring in homes. 28 Finally, Part I discusses § 1983 actions and
the doctrine of qualified immunity.29 Part II presents the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in Joyce v.
Town of Tewksbury ,30 outlining the relevant facts as well as the ma
jority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part III explores rele
vant substantive Fourth Amendment law and suggests that the First
Circuit erred in applying qualified immunity. Specifically, this Part
argues that at the time of the alleged misconduct in Joyce, Supreme
Court case law "clearly established" that police officers may not
enter a third party's home to execute an arrest warrant without first
obtaining a search warrant for the premises. Finally, Part III sug
gests that when courts-like the Joyce court-grant qualified im
munity without first wrestling with difficult Fourth Amendment
issues, the line between constitutional and unconstitutional searches
and seizures remains unclear. Further, this Part hypothesizes that
through decisions such as Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, courts pro
mote confusion among law enforcement officers as to the constitu
tionality of their actions. This Note concludes that the First
Circuit's avoidance of the Fourth Amendment issue, by holding that
the doctrine of qualified immunity protected the officers in Joyce,
could result in further infringement upon constitutionally protected
rights in the future.

26. See infra Part I.A.1 for a discussion of the use of general warrants and the
abuses connected with those warrants that the Framers sought to eradicate by enacting
the Fourth Amendment.
27. See infra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the warrant process and the distinc
tions between arrest warrants and search warrants.
28. See infra Part 1.B.1-3 for a discussion of the Supreme Court precedent rele
vant to the present issue.
29. See infra Part I.C.2 for a discussion of the doctrine of qualified immunity.
30. 112 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 1997).
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I.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, THE WARRANT CLAUSE, AND
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

To better understand the issue addressed in Joyce v. Town of
Tewksbury,31 it is necessary to first examine the history and devel
opment of the Fourth Amendment as well as the warrant require
ment set forth in the amendment. It is also necessary to examine
the relevant Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement as it pertains to arrests in
homes. Finally, to discern why the First Circuit in Joyce employed
the doctrine of qualified immunity, one must examine the purpose
and significance of qualified immunity.
A.

Development of the Fourth Amendment and Its Application
1.

Writs of Assistance and the Adoption of the Fourth
Amendment

The adoption of the Fourth Amendment was largely a reaction
to the abuse of discretion and power exercised pursuant to the writs
of assistance used in the colonies. 32 Also known as general war
rants, writs of assistance were most commonly used by customs offi
cials in the detection of smuggled goods. 33 Issued by the Superior
Court of the colony, general warrants allowed authorized persons
to "search any house, shop, warehouse . . . break open doors,
chests, packages . . . and remove any prohibited or uncustomed
goods or merchandise."34 They required no degree of suspicion,
were not particularized to person or place, and did not need to be
supported by information that illegal activity was taking place or
that illegal goods were being stored. 35 Although such writs were
31. 112 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 1997).
32. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment "was in large part a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless
searches that had so alienated the colonists"); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
51-60 (1937).
33. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) (stating that "[t]he hated writs
of assistance had given customs officials blanket authority to search where tl1ey pleased
for goods imported in violation of the British tax laws"); see also LASSON, supra note
32, at 56.
34. LASSON, supra note 32, at 53. The writs of assistance used in the colonies
were similar to the writs used in England, with the same authority given to the official
who held one, except that tl1e English Court of Exchequer issued tl1e writs used in
England. See id. at 53-54.
35. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 483, 500 (1995). In addi
tion to the arbitrary issuance of writs where no credible information was needed to
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issued by the Superior Court, they did not expire until the death of
the monarch. 36 Therefore, "[t]he discretion delegated to the official
was ... practically absolute and unlimited."37
Consequently, many colonial courts began to deny the issuance
of the general warrants, although required to do so by law,38 be
cause of criticisms regarding their legality.39 In response to these
concerns, the individual states adopted provisions in their constitu
tions to protect the people from the unfettered discretion of offi
cials associated with the general warrants. 40
During the ratification debates of the United States Constitu
tion, one of the principal arguments against ratification was the
omission of a bill of rights. 41 Although the states eventually ratified
the Constitution without a bill of rights, advocates of a bill of rights
continued to fight for its inclusion. 42 Thus, at the Constitutional
search for and seize goods, the official who seized the goods would receive an allotment
of the goods seized as recompense for his duties, thus furthering the injustices of the
procedure. See M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 13 (1978). But see LAS·
SON, supra note 32, at 54 (stating that general warrants issued for a case of libel were
limited in reach because they extended only to particular types of objects, namely,
libelous literature).
36. See Richard E. Hillary, II, Note, Arizona v. Evans and the Good Faith Excep
tion to the Exclusionary Rule: The Exception is Swallowing the Rule, 27 U. TOL. L.
REv. 473, 476 (1996); see also LASSON, supra note 32, at 57 (stating the writs expired
"six months after the death of the sovereign").
37. LASSON, supra note 32, at 54. James Otis, a Massachusetts attorney repre
senting a group of Boston merchants opposing the writs, argued that the writs of assist
ance were "the worst instruments of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English
liberty ...." Id. at 59; accord Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). Otis
further argued that the writs of assistance should be limited so that they were issued
only when supported by information given under oath that is particularized to a specific
seizure or search. See SMITH, supra note 35, at 282-83; see also Clancy, supra note 35, at
505.
38. See GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 71
(1995). The Townshend Act of 1767, enacted by the British Crown, specified the supe
rior or supreme courts of each colony as the bodies charged with issuing writs of assist
ance. See Hillary, supra note 36, at 476.
39. See LASSON, supra note 32, at 73.
40. Virginia, Vermont, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
and Massachusetts all adopted provisions similar to those contained in the Fourth
Amendment, and served as models for the current Fourth Amendment. See LASSON,
supra note 32, at 82 n.17; see also ANASTAPLO, supra note 38, at 71.
41. See generally LASSON, supra note 32, at 83-100.
42. See id. at 98-99. James Madison stated the following:
The General Government has a right to pass all laws which shall be necessary
to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collection are within the
discretion of the Legislature; may not general warrants be considered neces
sary for this purpose, as well as for some purposes which it was supposed at
the framing of their constitutions the State Governments had in view? If there
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Convention of 1787, it became clear that it was time to protect the
citizens of the United States from the federal government's pow
ers.43 The Founding Fathers had three concerns leading to the en
actment of the Fourth Amendment: (1) to "ensure that searches
and seizures would be justified by probable cause, [(2)] to restrict
their scope with the requirement of particularity, and [(3)] to en
force these limits with various mechanisms, including independent
judicial review."44
The Framers of the Bill of Rights viewed the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment as necessary to safeguard the citizens' rights.
The Supreme Court has stated that the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment facilitates the protection of liberty and privacy
interests. 45 The Framers secured this protection through the use of
two types of warrants: the arrest warrant and the search warrant.
2. The Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment is comprised of two clauses: the Rea
sonableness Clause46 and the Warrant Clause. 47 The Warrant
Clause, which embodies the warrant requirement, is particularly
was reason for restraining the State Governments from exercising this power,
there is like reason for restraining the Federal Government.
Id. at 99 (citation omitted).
43. See id. at 83.
44. Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1707, 1731 (1996); cf. TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTlTUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 41 (1969) (arguing that the Framers "were not concerned about war
rantless searches, but about overreaching warrants").
45. Although the Framers consciously intended the Fourth Amendment to pro
tect property and liberty rights, the Supreme Court has since interpreted the Fourth
Amendment as protecting individual privacy interests. See infra note 80.
46. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Reasonableness Clause protects individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures: "[t]he right of the people to be secure ...
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." Id.
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Warrant Clause provides that judges may
only issue warrants where probable cause exists, and the warrant must state with partic
ularity the object or person to be searched or seized: "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 327 (1978), the Supreme Court used the
term "Reasonableness Clause" to describe the first clause of the Fourth Amendment
and "Warrant Clause" to define the second clause. The Supreme Court had previously
labeled the two clauses in this manner. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
454 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to the second clause of the Fourth
Amendment as the "Warrant Clause" for the first time); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S.
287, 303 n.5 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (using the term "Reasonableness Clause"
to mean the first clause of the Fourth Amendment). However, Marshall was the first
case to use both terms. See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 327.
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significant where police' officers seek to either seize a person or ob
ject or search certain premises. Generally, the Warrant Clause re
quires police officers to obtain a warrant to either arrest a suspect
or search an individual's home. 48 However, although warrantless
searches and seizures are permissible in some instances,49 the War
rant Clause imposes strict guidelines on the issuance of warrants.50
The Warrant Clause provides that a judge or magistrate may
only issue a warrant where probable cause exists, and the warrant
must state with particularity the object or person to be searched or
seized: "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."51 In ob
taining a warrant, police first submit an affidavit to a judge or mag
istrate for a determination of sufficient probable cause. 52 The
affidavit must specify the facts and circumstances that support a
conclusion of probable cause, and not merely the officer's subjec
tive belief that probable cause exists. 53
Generally, "[p]robable cause exists where 'the facts and cir
cumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense
48. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (stating that warrantless
searches are "presumptively unreasonable" unless they fall under designated excep
tions); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (acknowledging that
automobile searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable); United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (recognizing that seizures are per se unreasona
ble unless supported by a warrant based upon probable cause); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that a search or seizure is reasonable if authorized by a
valid warrant); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925) (declaring that the
reasonableness of a seizure is determined by whether the officer had the requisite "rea
sonable or probablf! cause" as required by the warrant requirement).
49. See supra note 4 for a description of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement.
50. See supra note 47 and infra note 51 and accompanying text for the text of the
Warrant Clause and its restrictions on the issuance of warrants.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
52. See generally Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (discussing the
process of presenting an affidavit in order to obtain a warrant); United States v. Nelson,
511 F. Supp. 77, 80 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (stating that "[b]efore issuing the arrest warrant,
the magistrate is to determine from a complaint or affidavits filed with the complaint
that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it"); RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WAR.
RANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 15-36 (1985) (discussing
the warrant application process). Vital to this process is that the issuing magistrate be
"neutral and detached." See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
53. See LASSON, supra note 32, at 130.
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has been or is being committed."54 Once the magistrate determines
that there is probable cause and issues the warrant, the Fourth
Amendment requires that the warrant "particularly describ[e] the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."55 If
the officers executing the warrant "can with reasonable effort ascer
tain and identify the place intended"56 and "nothing is left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant,"57 the requirement
of particularity has been met. 58
The Fourth Amendment, by implication, authorizes two types
of warrants: arrest warrants and search warrants. A magistrate
may issue an arrest warrant upon a showing that there is probable
cause to believe an individual has committed a crime. 59 A magis
trate may issue a search warrant upon a showing that the object (or
person) of the search is located in a particular place. 60 Since it is
the Fourth Amendment's protection of liberty and privacy interests
that the Supreme Court seeks to uphold, understanding the distinct
protections afforded by the two types of warrants61 is important in
discerning the Court's application of· those protections to various
situations involving arrests.
54. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,175-76 (1949) (citation omitted) (al
terations in original); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (defining the
probable cause necessary for a search warrant as "a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place"); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
111 (1975) (stating that probable cause is "defined in terms of facts and circumstances
'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or
was committing an offense''') (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964»; Leslie A.
Maria, Investigation and Police Practices, 86 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1193 (1998) (discussing
probable cause).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
56. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).
57. Andersen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (citation omitted).
58. The Supreme Court has interpreted the requirement of particularity to mean
that the officer may do only what the warrant authorizes him or her to do, and no more.
See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,595 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating
that "[w]here [a] search is made under the authority of a warrant issued from a judicial
source, the scope of the search must be confined to the specific authorization of the
warrant").
59. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981).
60. See id.; see also LASSON, supra note 32, at 129 (emphasizing the differences
between the probable cause required for an arrest warrant and the probable cause re
quired for a search warrant). See generally Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204
(1981); ct. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.1(b), at
238-39 (3d ed. 1996) (stating that Steagald left uncertain whether an arrest warrant and
a search warrant are necessary for an arrest of a suspect in another's home; thus, the
safest approach is to obtain both).
61. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213 (stating that "the interests protected by the two
warrants differ").
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An arrest warrant authorizes police officers to deprive an indi
vidual of his or her liberty interests by seizing the individual. The
arrest warrant, therefore, protects the liberty interests of those not
named in the warrant. 62 A search warrant, on the other hand, pro
tects individual privacy interests. 63 By requiring 'an impartial judi
cial officer to determine that there is probable cause to search a
place for a particular object or person, a search warrant ensures
that an unauthorized search does not encroach upon an individual's
privacy.64
Preserving the liberty and privacy interests secured by the war
rant requirement has been the ultimate premise behind the
Supreme Court decisions regarding the legality of intrusions neces
sary for police officers to effect arrests. The following section in
troduces decisions that demonstrate the Court's continuing concern
with individual liberty and privacy.
B.

United States Supreme Court Decisions: Arrest Warrants,
Search Warrants, and Exigent Circumstances in Relation
to Home Arrests

Ever since the Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment,
changing fact patterns have challenged courts of every circuit to de
fine the reach of Fourth Amendment protections. 65 Three impor
62. See id. at 213, 214 n.7 ("[A]n arrest warrant authorizes the police to deprive a
person [named in the warrant] of his liberty ....").
63. See id.; see also Carrie N. Capwell, The Warrant Requirement, 85 GEO. LJ.
832,835-36 (1997) (stating that "[a] search warrant protects an individual's privacy in
terest in her home and possessions against unjustified police intrusions") (citing Stea
gald, 451 U.S. at 213).
64. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.24 (1980) ('''When the right of
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not"oy a policeman or government enforcement agent."') (quoting John
son v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948».
65. See, e.g., Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 112 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1997) (address
ing facts not entirely analogous to either Steagald or Santana); Thomas v. Roach, 165
F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 1999) (considering whether police officers used unreasonable
force when attempting to apprehend a suspect who was wielding a knife and a rock);
Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 1997) (considering whether police
officers acted unlawfully while executing a search warrant for plaintiff's home when
object of search warrant-plaintiff's nephew-did not reside in the home); Gould v.
Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 267 (4th Cir. 1998) (addressing the lawfulness of police conduct
when police secured a "no-knock" search warrant for plaintiff's home and fired at plain
tiff); United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 225-26 (4th CiT. 1990) (addressing the issue
of the constitutionality of doorway arrests when the suspect is in his hotel room);
Heitschmidt v. City of Houston, 161 F.3d 834, 837 (5th CiT. 1998) (addressing the issue
of the legality of detaining a suspect to search his house when officers lured suspect out
of the home on false pretenses and began the search); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d
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tant United States Supreme Court cases have shaped the
interpretation of the amendment as it pertains to the arrest of a
person inside the home: United States v. Santana,66 Payton v. New
York,67 and Steagald v. United States. 68 Santana held that a war
rantless entry may be justified by exigent circumstances,69 regard
less of the existence of a valid arrest warrant or search warrant.7°
Under Payton, an arrest warrant, which protects individual liberty
interests, is sufficient to protect the privacy interests of the subject
of an arrest warrant when the suspect is in his home.71 Steagald,
however, charges law enforcement officers with the duty to obtain a
search warrant before arresting a suspect in a third party's home.72
These three decisions shape the case law pertinent to the issue that
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed
in Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury.73
1.

A Suspect Cannot Defeat a Lawful Arrest by Retreating
into the Home: United States v. Santana

United States v. Santana 74 involved the issue of whether a sus
pect can escape a lawful warrantless arrest, which began in a public
place,75 by withdrawing into her home. 76 In Santana, police officers
proceeded to Santana's home to arrest her without an arrest war
1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1996) (considering police officers' failure to knock and announce
their purpose); United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1385 (7th Cir. 1991) (ad
dressing the constitutionality of doorway arrests when police officers approach a house
to arrest their suspect without an arrest warrant); Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100, 1103
(8th Cir. 1989) (addressing doorway arrest issue when given conflicting versions of the
arrest in question); Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1994)
(addressing the legality of police entering home in response to noise complaint to arrest
and search home without arrest warrants or search warrants); United States v.
Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995) (considering doorway arrest issue in con
text of a motel room).
66. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
67. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
68. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
69. See supra note 5 for a description of exigent circumstances.
70. See Santana, 427 U.S. at 43.
71. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 602.
72. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 205-06.
73. 112 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 1997).
74. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
75. The Supreme Court has held that the police may arrest a suspect without a
warrant when the suspect is in a public place. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 415 (1976) (holding that a warrantless felony arrest, for which there is probable
cause, is valid under the Fourth Amendment when the suspect is situated in a public
place).
76. See Santana, 427 U.S. at 42.

526

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:513

rant for alleged drug trafficking. 77 When the officers pulled up,
Santana was standing in the doorway of her house; as the officers
approached, Santana retreated into the vestibule of her house and
the officers followed her inside and arrested her.78 The Court held
that such a retreat from a public place to a private one could not
defeat the arrest and that a "hot pursuit" exigency justified the war
rantless entry into the subject's home. 79
The Court first noted that Santana had no expectation of pri
vacy80 while she stood outside her home in a public place. 81 Even
77. See id. at 40. An undercover officer of the Philadelphia Narcotics Squad ar
ranged a buy with a known drug dealer who received her drugs from Santana. See id. at
39.
78. See id. at 40. Santana was indicted for possession of heroin with intent to
distribute. See id. at 41.
79. See id. at 43. No precise definition for "hot pursuit" has been articulated.
The phrase first surfaced in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 n.7 (1948), "where
it was recognized that some element of a chase will usually be involved in a 'hot pursuit'
case." Santana, 427 U.S. at 43 n.3. The Court later elaborated on the phrase in Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970), characterizing the exigency as "hot pursuit of a flee
ing felon." [d.; accord Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100-01 (1990) (holding that
there was no exigency of "hot pursuit of a fleeing felon" where "[i]t was evident the
suspect was going nowhere .... [and] [i]f he came out of the house he would have been
promptly apprehended"); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (recognizing
that arrests for felonies, and not minor offenses, are the only situations in which the
exigent circumstances exception should be allowed).
80. The recognition of an individual's expectation of privacy began in Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), where the Supreme Court began
to shift Fourth Amendment protection from property interests to privacy interests. In
Warden, the Court stated that "the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the
protection of privacy rather than property." [d. at 304. Later the same year, in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), the Court elaborated on the notion that the
Fourth Amendment protects individual privacy, holding that the amendment safeguards
legitimate expectations of privacy. (emphasis added). Therefore, the Fourth Amend
ment protects an individual's subjective expectation of privacy, so long as it is "one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96
(1990) (citation omitted). See Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the
'Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,' 34 V AND. L. REv. 1289 (1981), for an insightful and
extensive discussion of the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy interests. For
further discussion, see Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect:
Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 327-44 (1998) (discuss
ing the development of the expectation of privacy theory); Stephen P. Jones, Reason
able Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth Amendment
Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REv. 907, 912-26 (1997) (discussing expectations of privacy
and what the concept means); Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure and the Positive Law:
Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL
OGY 249, 249-86 (1993) (discussing the Supreme Court's historical approach to privacy
interests).
81. See Santana, 427 U.S. at 42. The Court articulated that Santana's presence in
public justified her warrantless arrest under Watson. See id. See supra note 75 for an
explanation of the constitutionality of warrantless arrests under Watson.
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though the officers apprehended Santana almost immediately after
her entry into her house, the Court concluded that "hot pursuit"
justified the officers' entry.82 According to the Court, the exigency
of "hot pursuit" occurs whenever there is some sort of a chase. 83
The Court in Santana did not address the "question of whether
and under what circumstances a police officer may enter the home
af a suspect [absent an exigency showing] in order to make a war
rantless arrest."84 Four years later, however, the Supreme Court
addressed that specific issue in Payton.
2.

An Arrest Warrant is Sufficient to Justify Entry into a
Suspect's Home: Payton v. New York

In Payton v. New York,85 the Court addressed the specific issue
of whether the police may enter an arrestee's home to arrest a sus~
pect without an arrest warrant, and if so, under what circum
stances. 86 In Payton, police officers had probable cause to believe
that Payton had committed murder. 87 The officers went to Payton's
residence without an arrest warrant to effect Payton's arrest. 88
When no one answered their knock, the officers forcibly entered
Payton's home and seized evidence. 89 The Court held that absent
exigent circumstances,90 the Fourth Amendment "prohibits the po
82. See Santana, 427 U.S. at 42. While "hot pursuit" was the primary exigency at
issue in Santana, the Court's holding was also based upon the presence of another exi
gency-destruction of evidence. See id. at 43. The Court stated that "[o]nce Santana
saw the police, there was ... a realistic expectation that any delay would result in
destruction of evidence." [d. (emphasis added).
83. See id. The Court rejected the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania's interpretation of "hot pursuit" as "a chase ... 'in and about
[the] public streets.'" [d. at 43.
84. [d. at 45 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court also declined to address this
issue in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). In Watson, the Court expressly
declined to address such an issue because the case did not raise "the still unsettled
question ... 'whether and under what circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's
home to make a warrantless arrest.'" [d. at 418 n.6. (citation omitted).
85. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
86. See id. at 575. In the companion case of Riddick v. New York, police officers
likewise acted without an arrest warrant, and went to the home of Obie Riddick to
execute his arrest. See id. at 578. Riddick's son opened the door and the police could
see Riddick in bed from the open doorway. They then entered the house and placed
Riddick under arrest. See id. Both Payton and Riddick were convicted and the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions. See id. at 577-79.
87. See id. at 576.
88. See id.
89. See id. Although the police did not apprehend Payton at that time, Payton
later surrendered to police. See id. at 577.
.
90. See id. at 583. Whether or not the exigent circumstances· exception to the
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lice from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a sus
pect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest."91
In support of its holding, the Court in Payton noted that the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment intended the amendment to
prevent the abuse of discretion associated with general warrants. 92
It added that "[u]nreasonable searches and seizures conducted
without any warrant at all are condemned by the plain language of
the first clause of the Amendment. "93 The Court concluded that it
is lawful for police to enter a suspect's home to arrest him so long as
they have a valid arrest warrant and reason to believe the suspect is
within the home. 94 The Court explained why an arrest warrant, as
opposed to a search warrant, is sufficient to protect the privacy in-

warrant requirement applies turns, in part, upon the gravity of the offense the suspect
has committed. The notion that the seriousness of the offense is fundamental to the
determination of whether the exigent circumstance exception applies has been recog
nized throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740, 753 (1984) (stating that the "application of the exigent-circumstances exception in
the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to
believe that only a minor offense ... has been committed"). In his dissent in Payton,
Justice White recognized the importance of the felony limitation on arrests involving
exigent circumstances. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 616-17 (White, J., dissenting); see also
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948) (stating that "the gravity of the
offense" is to be considered in deciding whether officers are entitled to the exigency
exception). See William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into
Fourth Amendment Equations-Warrantless Entries into Premises: The Legacy of
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 439 (1990), for an insightful examination of
Welsh's gravity of the offense requirement and other exigent circumstances issues. See
supra note 5 for a general discussion of exigent circumstances.
91. Payton, 445 U.S. at 576.
92. See id. at 585; see also Sarah L. KIevit, Entry to Arrest a Suspect in a Third
Party's Home: Ninth Circuit Opens the Door-United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d
482 (/983),59 WASH. L. REv. 965, 966 (1984) (stating that the Fourth Amendment was
drafted to "prevent the indiscriminate and widespread searches made under the guise of
general warrants"). See supra Part 1.A.1 for a discussion of the purpose behind the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment.
93. Payton, 445 U.S. at 585. The Court further stated that "the 'physical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is di
rected.''' Id. (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972)). In giving great deference to the plain language of the Fourth Amendment and
its protections, the Court reasoned that "[we cannot] disregard the overriding respect
for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions." Id. at 601; see
generally Bryan Murray, After United States v. Vaneaton, Does Payton v. New York
Prevent Police from Making Warrantless Routine Arrests Inside the Home?, 26 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. 135, 141-42 (1996). See supra note 1 for the complete text of the
Fourth Amendment and supra note 47 for the text and a discussion of the Warrant
Clause.
94. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 603.
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terests of the suspect: 95
It is true that an arrest warrant requirement may afford less pro

tection than a search warrant requirement, but it will suffice to
interpose the magistrate's determination of probable cause be
tween the zealous officer and the citizen. ·If there is sufficient
evidence of a citizen's participation in a felony to persuade a ju
dicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally rea
sonable to require him to open his doors to the officers of the
law. 96

The Court in Payton did not address the authority of the police
to enter another person's home, a home in which they believed the
object of their arrest warrant was located. The Court explicitly
stated that it would not decide such an issue because neither Pay
ton, nor Riddick,97 the companion case consolidated with Payton by
the New York Court of Appeals, raised such a question. 98 The issue
presented itself one year later in Steagald.
3.

A Search Warrant is Necessary to Enter a Third Party's
Home to Effect an Arrest: Steagald v.
United States

In Steagald v. United States,99 the Court addressed the issue of
whether an officer may enter the home of a third party, without a
search warrant, to search for and arrest the subject of an arrest war
rant. too The Court held that absent exigent circumstances or con
95. See id. But see KIevit, supra note 92, at 967 (stating that "the Court failed to
explain why an arrest warrant was constitutionally sufficient").
96. Payton, 445 U.S. at 602-03. The state's argument prompted the Court's expla
nation of why an arrest warrant is sufficient in these circumstances. The state had ar
gued that only a search warrant based on probable cause to believe the suspect is at
home will sufficiently protect the privacy interests of the suspect; thus, since such a
requirement would be unrealistic, there should be no warrant required at all. See id. at
602.

97. See supra note 86 for a discussion of the Riddick facts.
98. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 583.
99. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
100. See id. at 205. In Steagald, Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")
agents were notified by an informant that Ricky Lyons, the subject of an arrest warrant,
was staying at the home of Gary Steagald. See id. at 206. DEA agents drove to the
house looking for Lyons. See id. After frisking Steagald and another man on the front
lawn, the agents went inside the house to locate Lyons. See id. Lyons was not present,
but the officers found narcotics during the initial search of Steagald's home. See id.
The officers subsequently obtained a search warrant to re-search the house, at which
time they found more drugs. See id. at 206-07. Because the government successfully
argued that Steagald's connection with the house was enough to establish constructive
possession of the narcotics, he was brought up on drug charges. See id. at 207-09.
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sent, police must procure a search warrant to enter a third party's
home to search for the target of an arrest warrant. 101
In Steagald, the Court reaffirmed various maxims of Fourth
Amendment law. First, the Court stated that lacking exigent cir
cumstances or consent, the "threshold [of the house] may not rea
sonably be crossed without a warrant."102 Second, the Court
summarized the protections afforded by arrest warrants,103 stating
that a magistrate issues an arrest warrant upon a showing of prob
able cause that an individual has committed a crime, and protects
that "individual from an unreasonable seizure. "104 Third, the Court
distinguished search warrants from arrest warrants, stating that a
magistrate may issue a search warrant when an officer demonstrates
that there is "probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of
a search is located in a particular place ...."105 Thus, a search
warrant protects privacy interests in the home and its possessions
from an unreasonable invasion by police officers. 106 In essence, the
Court stated that an arrest warrant protects liberty interests and a
search warrant protects privacy interests. 107
By employing these maxims, the Court concluded that an
arrest warrant provides inadequate protection to a third party's pri
vacy interests when police enter his home to search for and arrest
the subject of their arrest warrant. lOS In relying on the differences
101. See id. at 205-06. Because Steagald was not a civil case brought pursuant ,to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court had no occasion to consider whether the officers' actions
were reasonable under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
102. Id. at 212 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 590). See generally The Supreme
Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 262·70 (1981) (discussing Steagald in great
detail).
'
103. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213-14.
104. Id. at 213.
105. Id. While both an arrest warrant and a search warrant are subjected to the
scrutiny of a detached judicial officer, they serve to protect different interests. See id.
See supra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the distinctions between arrest warrants and
search warrants.
106. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213-14.
107.
108.

See id.
See id. at 213. The Court did address the government's argument that re

quiring a search warrant would greatly impede the efforts of law enforcement officers.
See id. at 220-22. It concluded that such a requirement presents a minimal burden since
there are options available to lessen the burden of obtaining a search warrant. See id.;
see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (arresting a suspect in his own
home requires only an arrest warrant); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24
(1976) (holding that arrests in public places do not require an arrest warrant); FED. R
CRIM. P. 41(c)(2) (allowing police to obtain telephonic search warrants when
necessary).
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between search warrants and arrest warrants, the Court assessed
the plain language of the Fourth Amendment and determined that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment admits of no exemption from the war
rant requirement when the search of a home is for a person
rather than a thing. . .. [The] language plainly suggests that the
same sort of judicial determination must be made. when the
search of a person's home is for another person as is. necessary
when the search is for an object. Specifically ... the magistrate,
rather than the police officer, must make the decision. that prob
able cause exists to believe that the person . . . to be seized is
within a particular place. 109

Any other result, noted the Court, would produce considerable po
tential for abuse because officers could search the homes of all the
acquaintances and friends of a suspect or use the arrest warrant as a
pretext to search homes for illegal activity.u o
United States v. Santana,111 Payton v. New York 112 and Steagald
v. United States 113 all play an important role in interpreting the
Fourth Amendment in the context of arrests. Santana provides that
exigent circumstances will justify entry despite the absence of a
warrant authorizing the entry.114 Payton and Steagald, taken to
gether, establish the critical distinctions between arrest warrants
and search warrants and the interplay between the two; while an
arrest warrant is sufficient to secure the privacy interests of a sus
109. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 214 n.7. The Court added the following:
[The police may not] use an arrest warrant as legal authority to enter the home
of a third party to conduct a search. . .. Because it does not authorize the
police to deprive the third person of his liberty, it cannot embody any deriva
tive authority to deprive this person of his interest in the privacy of his home.
[d. Indeed, the Court elaborated that "[b]ecause an arrest warrant authorizes the po
lice to deprive a person of his liberty, it necessarily also authorizes a ).imited invasion of
that person's privacy interest when it is necessary to arrest him in his home." [d.
110. See id. at 215; see also The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 102, at
264-65 (discussing the Steagald Court's fear that pretextual searches will be used to
bypass the warrant requirement). A "pretextual search" is one in which law enforce
ment officers search a home pursuant to a warrant for evidence of one crime, when they
are in fact only interested in seizing evidence relating to another crime-a crime for
which no search warrant has been obtained. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 147
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Referring to pre textual searches, the Court in Steagald
simply meant that law enforcement officers would have no reasonable, lawful basis for
searching the homes of a suspect's friends and acquaintances, nor would they have a
lawful basis for using an arrest warrant to search homes for illegal activity, and there
fore such searches would be pretextual. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 215.
111. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
112. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
113. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
114. See Santana, 427 U.S. at 43.
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pect in his home,115 a search warrant is necessary when the suspect
is in a third party's home.116 Moreover, these three cases form the
precedent relevant to the issue addressed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Joyce v. Town of Tewk
sbury,117 Ultimately, this precedent is also relevant to suits under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the "clearly established law"118 standard for
qualified immunity employed by the First Circuit in Joyce. How
ever, before one can understand the First Circuit's holding in Joyce,
it is necessary to examine the relationship between § 1983 suits and
the defense of qualified immunity.
C.

Section 1983 and the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity
1.

Section 1983

This section provides a federal cause of action against individu
als acting under color of state law119 for violations of constitutional
or federal statutory rights,12O The purposes of § 1983 are twofold:
(1) to deter state officials from abusing their authority and (2) to
provide a remedy, where deterrence fails, for individuals who are
victims of deprivations of federal constitutional or statutory
rightS. 121
115. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 576.
116. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 205-06.
117. 112 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 1997).
118. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). See infra notes 146,
155-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "clearly established law" standard
and its relevance to qualified immunity analysis.
119. "Under color of state law" applies to three classes of defendants: state gov
ernment officials, private individuals, and municipalities. See Hawkins, supra note 14,
at 360.
120. Section 1983 protects "rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Consti
tution and laws." 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1994); see also Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161
(1992); Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999); Shapiro, supra note 13, at
249 (stating that § 1983 "provides individuals with a federal cause of action for viola
tions of their constitutional and other federal statutory rights by persons acting under
color of state law").
121. See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161 (stating that the purpose of § 1983 "is to deter
state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their feder
ally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails"); see also
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 563 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that § 1983's
purpose "was to provide redress for the deprivation of civil rights").
Congress introduced § 1983 in 1871 as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act. See Ku Klux
Klan Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); see also Pierson, 386 U.S. at 559 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the statute "came on the books as § 1 of the Ku Klux Clan Act
of April 20, 1871"); Burris, supra note 14, at 132 ("The common title of the Act-the
Ku Klux Klan Act-indicates its purpose: to redress wrongs by those who wore black
robes during the day and white robes at night."); Hawkins, supra note 14, at 356 ("Orig
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Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to make two allegations in or
der to state a cause of action: "First, the plaintiff must allege that
some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must
allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territoriallaw."122 Although the deprivation
must have been "committed by a person acting under color of state
law,"123 there are three possible defendants in a § 1983 suit: 124 state
or local officials, private individuals, and municipalities. 125
inally, the United States Congress enacted § 1983 as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871 'to give force and effect to the guarantees of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments."') (citing C. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND
CIVIL RrGlITS ACTIONS IN TIiE FEDERAL COURTS D2-1 (1987 revised ed.)). Over many
objections to the statute, including the breadth of the statute and an unwillingness to
usurp state authority and hold state officials liable, Congress passed § 1983. See gener
ally Burris, supra note 14, at 132-34 (providing a brief discussion of the objections to
the statute). Although the statue initially sought to redress the wrongs committed by
the Klan, "the remedy created was not a remedy against [only the Klan] or its members
but against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to
enforce a state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961), overruled by Monell
v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) ("[W]e now overrule Monroe v.
Pape ... insofar as it holds that local governments are wholly immune from suit under
§ 1983.").
122. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 362, 365 (1980); see also Dunn v. Tennessee, 697
F.2d 121, 125 (6th Cir. 1982) (explaining that the plaintiff must plead two requirements
in a § 1983 action: first, "a deprivation of ... 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws,'" and second, that the defendants deprived the plaintiff of
those rights" 'under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory"') (citations omitted).
123. Rodriques v. Furtado, 950 F.2d 805, 813 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Thomas, 165
F.3d at 142 (stating that "[t]o prevail on a § 1983 claim a plaintiff must establish that a
person acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal right").
124. See Hawkins, supra note 14, at 360; see also Shapiro, supra note 13, at 250
51. According to Shapiro, there are two types of § 1983 suits:
The first type [of suit] arises when government policy or a government official
following government policy directly causes injury. In such a case, the injured
party may sue the government directly. In the second scenario, a government
employee who is not acting pursuant to official policy causes the harm. In this
situation, the injured party may bring suit against the employee in his personal
capacity.
.
[d. at 250-51 (footnotes omitted); see also Blum, infra note 125, at 14-16 (providing a
brief discussion of the difference between suing a government official in his personal
capacity and suing a government official in his official capacity).
125. A plaintiff in a § 1983 suit may not sue a state government directly because
the Eleventh Amendment forbids suits against states. The Eleventh Amendment pro
vides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. See generally Karen M. Blum, Local Government Liability Under Section
1983, 420 PRAc. LAW INST.ILITIG. 9, 19 (1991) ("In the absence of consent to suit or
waiver of immunity, a state is shielded from suit in federal court by virtue of the Elev
enth Amendment.").
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While § 1983, on its face, does not provide for any immuni
ties,126 the Supreme Court has "accorded certain government offi
cials ... qualified immunity from suit if the 'tradition of immunity
was so firmly rooted in the common law and was supported by such
strong policy reasons that "Congress would have specifically so pro
vided had it wished to abolish the doctrine." "'127
2.

Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense,128 which shields
public officials129 from liability in civil actions for alleged violations
of constitutionally or statutorily protected rights. 130 The primary
For government officials, the test, enunciated in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), is whether the official carries "a badge of authority of a State and represent[s] it
in some capacity." Id. at 172; see also Hawkins, supra note 14, at 360-61. The test for
whether a private individual has acted under "color of state law" is whether there is a
"sufficient nexus" between the government and the conduct of the private individual.
See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 144 (1970). In determining whether this
nexus exists, courts should consider the following factors: (1) source of funding, (2)
extent of government regulation, (3) exclusivity of the government function, and (4)
existence of a symbiotic relationship. See Hawkins, supra note 14, at 361-62 (citing
Blum v. Yartsky, 457 U.S. 991,991 (1982». The test for whether a municipality will be
liable under § 1983 is whether the constitutional or statutory deprivation resulted from
an official policy or custom of the governmental body. See Monell v. Department of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Hawkins, supra note 14, at 362; Shapiro, supra
note 13, at 250.
126. Indeed, the text of the statute provides that "every person" who violates
constitutionally or statutorily protected rights "shall be liable." See 42 U.S.c. § 1983
(1994).
127. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1992) (quoting Owens v. City of Inde
pendence,445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980»; see also Burris, supra note 14, at 125 ("Although
the statute's language, legislative history, and logic all indicate that Congress intended
to abolish common-law immunities, the Supreme Court has overlain the Section 1983
cause of action with immunities based in the common-law."). In addition to qualified
immunity, the judiciary accords certain individuals-although not police officers-abso
lute immunity. See generally Hawkins, supra note 14, at 364.
128. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). An affirmative defense is
a "matter asserted by [the] defendant which, assuming the complaint to be true, consti
tutes a defense to it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 60 (6th ed. 1990). Pursuant to FED.
R. CRIM. P. 8(c), and most local rules of evidence, "all affirmative defenses must be
raised in the responsive pleading (answer) ...." Id.
129. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 512 (1994) (stating that "[t]he doctrine
of qualified immunity shields public officials ... from damages actions"); Wyatt, 504
U.S. at 168-69 (holding that qualified immunity is not available for private citizens).
130. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (stating that qualified
immunity "shield[s public officials] from civil damages ... as long as their actions could
reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have vio
lated"); see also David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme
Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
23, 26-27 (1989) (noting that qualified immunity serves to "protect[] government of
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purpose of qualified immunity "is to protect [public officials] 'from
undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling
threats of liability.'''131 Therefore, qualified· immunity serves three
purposes: (1) it protects public officials' "ability to serve the public
good,"132 (2) it guarantees that the threat of liability does not dis
suade skillful candidates from entering public service,l33 and (3) it
permits officials to perform discretionary tasks that they would
otherwise fear to undertake. 134
American common law provided the roots for the doctrine of
qualified immunity as it is known todayP5 At common law, the
courts applied both objective and subjective elements to the de
fense of qualified immunity.136 The objective element of qualified
ficers from liability for money damages ... [and] directly limits individual liability for
constitutional violations").
131. Elder, 510 U.S. at 514 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806); see also Wyatt, 504
U.S. at 167 (stating that the doctrine of "[qJualified immunity strikes a balance between
compensating those who have been injured by official conduct and protecting govern
ment's ability to perform its traditional functions" (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819»;
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638 ("[P]ermitting damages suits against government officials can
entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability
and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties."
(citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814»; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,506 (1978) (stating
that immunity was justified, in part, to preserve the "public interest in encouraging the
vigorous e~ercise of official authority"); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (recog
nizing tnat qualified in1munity permits officials to perform their duties in a "principled
and fearless" manner); Brown, supra note 17, at 670 (stating that the purpose of quali
fied in1munity is to permit officials to perform their duties "undeterred by potential
harassing litigation").
132. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167.
133. See id.; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (stating that one
of the consequences of limiting qualified immunity is to "'deter[ ] ... able people from
public service"') (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816).
134. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (stating that qualified immunity prevents the
"inhibition of discretionary action").
135. See generally Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557 (1967) (stating that "the defense of
good faith and probable cause, which [was] available [at] common-law ... is also avail
able ... in [a § 1983] action"); Rudovsky, supra note 130, at 35-42 (discussing the histor
ical development of qualified immunity). The common law form of qualified in1munity
was most commonly termed the "good faith" immunity. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.
Moreover, the common law defense of good faith and probable cause is the foreground
for the current doctrine of qualified immunity as it applies to the Fourth Amendment.
See Rudovsky, supra note 130, at 39 (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-41). In Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), the Court stated that "while we look to the common law for
guidance [in determining whether § 1983 affords the same in1munity] we do not assume
that Congress intended to incorporate every common law immunity into § 1983 in unal
.
tered form." [d. at 340.
136. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815. In Harlow, the Court stated the following:
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements ... qualified in1munity
would be defeated if an official 'knew or reasonably should have known that
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immunity was a respect for fundamental constitutional rights, and
the courts presumed that the public official knew what those basic,
fundamental rights were.137 The sUbjective element, on the other
hand, involved" 'permissible intentions'" r good faith.138
In 1982, 'in the case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald,139 the Supreme
Court disposed of the subjective element of the qualified immunity
inquiry.140 The Court reasoned that an inquiry into the official's
good faith involved "substantial costs,"141 and the subjective ele
the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the mali
cious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights ... .'
Id. (citations omitted); see also Stephen Yagman, Objectively Reasonable Unreasonable
ness: The End of Qualified Immunity in Fourth Amendment Section 1983 Cases?, 554
!>RAe. L. INST. 911, 922 (1996) (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555, 557, and stating that the
common law defense of immunity consisted of two prongs: good faith and probable
cause); cf. Kathryn Dix Sowle, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Un
resolved Issues of the Conditions for Its Use and the Burden of Persuasion, 55 TuL. L.
REv. 326, 341-42 (1981) (stating that only an officer's good faith was needed to find
immunity).
137. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 ("The objective element involves a presumptive
knowledge of respect for 'basic, unquestioned constitutional rights.''') (quoting Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975»; cf. Yagman, supra note 136, at 922 (stating that
the objective element is probable cause).
138. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322
(1975»; see also Yagman, supra note 136, at 922 (stating that the subjective component
was good faith).
139. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In Harlow, the plaintiff, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, brought
an action against two senior Nixon White House aides, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for
conspiracy to unlawfully discharge Fitzgerald in retaliation for Fitzgerald's plan to
"'blow the whistle' on some 'shoddy purchasing practices' by exposing [them] to public
view." Id. at 804.
140. See id. at 818; see generally James Flynn Mozingo, Comment, The Con
founding Prong ofthe Harlow v. Fitzgerald Qualified Immunity Test: When Is A Consti
tutional Right Clearly Established?, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoe. 797, 800-03, 806-10 (1994)
(reviewing Harlow and the new objective test for qualified immunity); Edward W.
Mayer, Jr., Anderson v. Creighton: Qualified Immunity-Is Good Faith All That Is
Required?, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 255, 261-63 (1989) (discussing Harlow and its
"objective reasonableness" standard); Rudovsky, supra note 130, at 42-44 (discussing
Harlow and its dismissal of the subjective element of the qualified immunity determina
tion); cf. Gildin, supra note 14, at 377-79, 386-87 (discussing Harlow and arguing that
eradicating the subjective element of qualified immunity analysis is contrary to the pol
icy reasons of 42 U.S.c. § 1983-affording private citizens retribution for violation of
their constitutional rights-because "[e]ven if the officer meant to harm the plaintiff, he
is immune if the constitutional right violated was not 'clearly established' at the time of
his actions").
141. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. The societal costs emphasized by the Harlow
Court included subjecting public officials to the hazards of trial. See id. at 816. More
specifically, the Court noted the general costs of "distraction of officials from their ...
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public
service" as well as the "special" cost of "broad-ranging discovery" where "there often is
no clear end to the relevant evidence." Id. at 816-17. Therefore, the Court concluded

I
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ment of qualified immunity disrupted both the judicial system142
and the actions of officials. 143 Thus, the Court stated that "[t]he
defense [should] tum ... on objective factors. "144 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court reasoned that "[r]eliance on the objective
reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to
clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of govern
ment and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on
summary judgment."145 Today, "government officials performing
discretionary functions ... are shielded from liability for civil dam
ages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known. "146
In United States v. Leon,147 the Court, while addressing the is
sue of whether to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a defec
tive search warrant, defined the objective reasonableness involved
in a Fourth Amendment inquiry.148 The Court stated that objective
reasonableness meant whether a reasonable police officer, similarly
situated, would have known that his conduct violated a clearly es
tablished right.149 In Malley v. Briggs, 150 the Court employed the
objective reasonableness standard of Leon in the qualified immu
nity context, holding "that the same standard of objective reasona
that removing the subjective element of the inquiry would reduce those costs. See id. at
817-18.
142. See id. at 816. The subjective element of qualified immunity disrupted the
judicial system in that it caused "insubstantial claims" to proceed to trial. [d. The
Court stated that since the application of qualified immunity depended upon the sub
jective good faith of the official, and because extensive discovery was usually required
to establish good faith, summary judgment was inapplicable, and made dispensing with
an "insubstantial claim[]" before trial impossible. See id. at 816-17. Thus, the Court
abolished the subjective element to prevent these "insubstantial claims" from proceed
ing to trial. [d. at 816.
143. See id. at 818.
144. [d. at 819.
145. [d. at 818.
146. [d.
147. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
148. See id. at 900.
149. See id. at 922 n.23 (stating that "the objectively ascertainable question [is]
whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was ille
gal") (emphasis added). The Court held that if the police officer reasonably believed
that the search warrant was valid, the evidence obtained through the defective warrant
need not be suppressed in the criminal trial of the suspect charged with the crime. See
id. at 922, 926. The standard applied in Leon to determine whether to suppress the
evidence is the same standard used to resolve whether a police officer is entitled to a
qualified immunity defense. See id. at 922 n.23.
150. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
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bleness ... applied in '... Leon ... defines the qualified immunity
accorded an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an
unconstitutional arrest. "151
Although the test for qualified immunity is objective reasona
bleness, the Court has "recognized that it is inevitable that law en
forcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly
conclude that" their actions were lawful.1 52 Accordingly, the real
inquiry, and what a plaintiff must prove to overcome a defense of
qualified immunity in a § 1983 case, is whether the applicable law
was "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violation. 153 If
the plaintiff succeeds in demonstrating that "the law was clearly es
tablished, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a rea
sonably competent public official should know the law governing
his conduct. "154
In Anderson v. Creighton,155 the Court attempted to define
what the "clearly established law" test enunciated in Harlow en
tails.156 It stated that the term "clearly established" means that
"[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear [so] that a reason
able official would understand" that his conduct violates that estab
lished right.1 57 Specifically, more than a mere general recognition
151. Id. at 344; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (con
cluding that the objective test is "whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the]
warrantless search to be lawful") (emphasis added); Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137,
142 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The doctrine of qualified immunity shields police officers acting in
their official capacity from suits for damages under 42 U.S.c. § 1983, unless their ac
tions violate clearly-established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would
have known.").
152. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641. The Court limited qualified immunity by provid
ing that the defense does not protect those officials who are "plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law." Malley, 475 U.S. at 341.
153. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Court further in
structed that discovery should not be permitted until the immunity issue is resolved.
See id.; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (stating that "[u]nless the
plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant
pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of
discovery").
154. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
155. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
156. See id. at 639; see also Mayer, supra note 140, at 270-72, 279-80 (reviewing
Anderson and asserting that Anderson gives guidance to the lower courts in determin
ing whether the right alleged to have been violated is sufficiently specific so as to be
"clearly established"). But see Rudovsky, supra note 130, at 44-45 (stating that Davis v.
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192-93 (1984) and Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 517 "made clear that
something more than the existence of general legal principals (the due process right to a
pretermination hearing or fourth amendment prohibition against warrantless searches)
[is] necessary to show ~hat the controlling legal doctrine was 'clearly established"').
157. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.

1999]FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF LIBERTY AND PRIVACY 539

of a broad right is necessary for a law to be "clearly established. "158
Rather, the plaintiff must establish that courts recognize a particu
lar application of the broader right and the contours of that general
application are sufficiently analogous to the circumstances of the
case in question. 159 The Court clarified that its definition of
"clearly established" does not mean that qualified immunity applies
only to the courts that have not previously held the specific conduct
in question unlawful, but rather, "that in the light of pre-existing
law the unlawfulness [of this conduct] must be apparent."160
Whether the right was "clearly established" at the time of the al
leged misconduct is a question of law, not one of fact.1 61
In Elder v. Hol!oway,162 the Court considered the applicability
of qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit against the arresting officers,
alleging that they violated Elder's Fourth Amendment rightS. 163 In
Elder, police officers sought to arrest Elder at work, a public place,
in order to avoid the necessity of an arrest warrant. l64 Elder, how
ever, had already returned home from work, so the officers sur
rounded his home and demanded that he come outside. 165 The
Court held that in order to effectively determine whether govern
ment officials are entitled to qualified immunity, it is necessary to
158. See id. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated the following:
The operation of this standard, however, depends substantially upon the level
of generality at which the relevant "legal rule" is to be identified. For exam
ple, the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due
Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates that
Clause ... violates a clearly established right. . .. But if the test of "clearly
established law" were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no
relationship to the "objective legal reasonableness" that is the touchstone of
Harlow.
Id. at 639.
159. See id. at 640.
160. Id.
161. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994); see also Swain v. Spinney,
117 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that the ultimate question of whether a reasonable
law enforcement agent could have believed his conduct did not violate the constitu
tional right asserted is a question of law). Where, however, the issue is on appeal, the
question of law to be determined by the reviewing court is "whether the law clearly
proscribed the actions the defendant claims he took." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528.
162. 510 U.S. 510 (1994).
163. See id. at 512.
164. See id. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), permits police officers
to arrest a suspect when they have probable cause without an arrest warrant when the
suspect is in a public place. See id. at 418-20.
165. See Elder, 510 U.S. at 512. Elder suffered an epileptic seizure when he
emerged from the house, fell on the sidewalk, and suffered brain· trauma and partial
paralysis. See id. at 512. Elder sued the arresting officers under 42 u.s.c. § 1983,
claiming that his warrantless arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 516.
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consider all available precedent concerning the relevant issue. 166
Specifically, the Court noted that the lower court in Elder should
have considered a previous decision,167 a decision that "might have
alerted a reasonable officer to the constitutional implications [of
their actions]," to determine whether the officers acted reasonably
under a qualified immunity analysis. 168
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has
determined that the Harlow and Anderson rulings, taken together,
fashion the following two-prong test for qualified immunity de
fenses: 169 (1) whether the right was "clearly established" and (2)
166. See id.
167. See id. at 513-14 (citing United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir.
1985), as the applicable previous decision). The Supreme Court noted that the court in
Al-Azzawy held that the location of the arrestee, not the arresting officers, determines
whether a particular arrest takes place inside or outside the home. See id. (citing Al
Azzawy, 754 F.2d at 893). Al-Azzawy was decided one year before the circumstances
in Elder, and the Ninth Circuit considered the precedent to have "been unearthed too
late." . See id. at 514. The Supreme Court, however, held that this precedent made
Elder's rights "clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity. See id. at 515
16.
168. See id. at 513 (quoting Elder v. Holloway, 975 F.2d 1388, 1391-92 (9th Cir.
1991». The Court noted that the determination of whether the right asserted was
firmly established at the time of the conduct in question is a question of law for the
appellate judge to decide de novo. See id. at 516. Thus, "[a] court engaging in review of
a qualified immunity judgement should ... use its 'full knowledge of its own [and other
relevant] precedents.'" Id. The Court reversed the judgement of the Court of Appeals
and remanded the case so that the lower court could consider the Al-Azzawy decision.
See id. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), the Supreme Court noted that the
proper inquiry as to whether qualified immunity applies is "whether it was clearly es
tablished" at the time of the alleged violation that such conduct was unconstitutional.
See id. at 530. See Rudovsky, supra note 130, at 44-45, for a discussion of Mitchell.
169. See Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that "[t]here are
two prongs to the qualified immunity analysis"); St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d
20,24 (1st Cir. 1995) (employing a two-prong test for qualified immunity). Other cir
cuits take very similar approaches. See, e.g., Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142-43 (2d
Cir. 1999) (stating that the two prongs of qualified immunity are as follows: "[f]irst, a
plaintiff must allege the violation of a clearly-established constitutional or statutory
right. Second, qualified immunity will be denied only if a reasonable official should
have known that the challenged conduct violated that established right"); Gould v. Da
vis, 165 F.3d 265, 269 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that the court "must identify the right
allegedly violated ... decide whether the right was clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation; and ... determine whether a reasonable person in the officer's posi
tion would have known that his or her actions violated that right"); Heitschmidt v. City
of Houston, 161 F.3d 834, 836-37 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that the two prongs are
whether the "pleadings, if accepted as true, (1) conceivably state violations of clearly
established Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) allege conduct that is objectively unrea
sonable"); Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that the
court must determine that the police officer's "conduct did not violate clearly estab
lished law of which a reasonable person would have known"); Dickerson v. McClellan,
101 F.3d 1151, 1157-58 (6th Cir. 1996) (identifying the three prongs as (1) whether "a
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whether a reasonable official should have known that his or her
conduct violated that right. 170 In addition to this two-prong test,
the First Circuit has taken a somewhat fact-specific approach to the
issue of qualified immunity.l71 This approach does not explicitly
require the specific conduct to have been previously deemed unlaw
ful per se. l72 Rather, the test is whether a reasonable officer could
have believed that the challenged conduct was lawful when viewed
in light of all preceding case law, taken as a whole. 173 Thus, to over
come the defense of qualified immunity the plaintiff must prove
that there is sufficient precedent "to clearly establish that, if a court
were presented with such a situation, the court would find that the
plaintiff's rights were violated."174
The doctrine of qualified immunity, taken together with
Supreme Court precedent, laid the groundwork for the First Cir
cuit's decision in Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury p5
II.
A.

JOYCE V. TOWN OF TEWKSBURY

Facts

On August 6, 1989, with knowledge of an outstanding arrest
constitutional violation occurred," (2) whether the constitutional violation "involved
'clearly established constitutional rights,'" and (3) whether the officer's conduct" 'was
objectively unreasonable"'); Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1351 (8th Cir.
1994) (stating that the rule of qualified immunity states that a police officer will be
immune from liability "unless a reasonable person in his position would have known
that his actions violated clearly established law").
170. See Swain, 117 F.3d at 9 (maintaining that the first prong is whether "the
constitutional right in question [was] clearly established at the time of the alleged viola
tion" and the second prong is whether "a reasonable, similarly situated official [WOUld]
understand that the challenged conduct violated that established right"); Bums v. Lo
ranger, 907 F.2d 233, 235-36 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that the first prong is whether the
right alleged to have been violated was "clearly established" at the time in question,
and the second prong is whether "a reasonable official situated in the same circum
stances should have understood that the challenged conduct violated that established
right").
171. See Swain, 117 F.3d at 9 (stating that the second prong of the test is "highly
fact specific" and cannot be resolved on summary judgment if material facts are in
dispute).
172. See Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the plain
tiff is not required to produce individual cases that hold the particular alleged miscon
duct unlawful, and may simply demonstrate that cases exist in which the right is so
clearly defined that no reasonable official could believe his actions were lawful).
173. See id.; see also Mozingo, supra note 140, at 817-18.
174. Vance, 868 F.2d at 16.
175. 112 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 1997).
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warrant for Lance Joyce,176 police officers Donovan and Budryk
approached the home of Joanne and James Joyce to arrest Lance. l77
Although Lance did not live with his parents,178 the police received
a tip earlier in the evening that Lance was visiting his parents that
nighU79 At approximately 11:30 p.m.,180 Lance opened the interior
door of the Joyce home at the officer's knock, while keeping the
outer screen door closed. 181 When the officers announced their
purpose and aSked Lance to step outside, he retreated to the inte.-:
rior of the house. 182 As Lance retreated, the officers followed him
inside.l 83 James and Joanne Joyce entered the room and asked the
officers if they had a warrant. l84 Because the officers did not have
the actual warrant with them, Mr. Joyce left the room to call the
police station to verify the status of the warrant.1 85 While Lance's
father was on the phone, an altercation occurred between Mrs.
Joyce and the officers as she protested Lance's arrest. 186 While one
officer secured Joanne's arms, the other officer arrested Lance. 187
The Joyces brought suit against the two officers, the chief of police,
and the town under 42 U.S.c. § 1983,188 claiming that the officers
violated their Fourth Amendment rights by entering the Joyce
home without a search warrant. 189 By margin order,l90 the district
court.granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
176. Lance's arrest warrant was for violation of a restraining order. See Joyce,
11,2 F.3d at 20.
177. See id.
178. Lance resided in Lowell, Massachusetts, which is several towns away from
Tewksbury, Massachusetts. See Appellants' Brief at 4, Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 112
F,3d 19 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 95-1814). At the time of his arrest, Lance was twenty-five
years old. See id.
179. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 20.
180. See Appellants' Brief at 4, Joyce (No. 95-1814) .
. 181. See joyce, 112 F.3d at 20.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. Although there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Lance, the
officers did not have the warrant with them. See id.
185. See id.· Indeed, an arrest warrant, charging Lance with violation of a protec
tive order, did exist. See id. at 20, 22.
186. See id . .at 21.
187. See id.
188. See supra note 10 for the text of the statute.
189. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 21.
190. A margin order is either a typed or hand-written notation in the margin of a
motion presented to the court, which explains the judge's ruling on the motion. See
BLACK'S LAW DrcnONARY 1096 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that an "order" is a "[djirection
of a court or judge made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment, which
determines some point"). Thus, in Joyce, there is no lower court record.
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issue of illegal entry, stating that "[t]here is no evidence in the rec~
ord to support [that] the entry was in violation of the Fourth
Amendment."191 Joanne Joyce (hereinafter "Joyce") appealed, and
a panel of the First Circuit affirmed the district court's order for
summary judgment. 192 Joyce then petitioned the First Circuit for a
rehearing en banc. 193
B.

Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit

The court held that the defense of qualified immunity pr()~
tected the officers from liability since the Fourth Amendment pre
cedent pertinent to the issue was not "clearly established" so as to
make their actions unreasonable. 194 The dissent, however, asserted
that the law was "clearly established" by virtue of Steagald v. United
States,195 and therefore qualified immunity was inappropriate. 196
1.

Majority Opinion

The majority in Joyce began its discussion with a brief exami
nation of case law relevant to the Fourth Amendment issue at
hand. 197 The court noted that "even when armed with an arrest
warrant, police must generally have a search warrant to lawfully
enter a third person's home."198 The court acknowledged, however,
that police may enter a third person's house when there is an exi
gency,199 and that under Santana "hot pursuit" qualifies as an exi
gent circumstance. 2oo
Joyce argued that the facts of the case did not support a finding
191. Joyce, 112 F.3d at 21.
192. See id. While both of the Joyces brought the original suit, James Joyce died
during the litigation and Joanne Joyce brought the appeals on her own behalf and as
executrix of the estate of James Joyce. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 23.
195. 451 U.S. 204 (1981). See supra Part I.B.3 for a detailed discussion of
Steagald.
196. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 25-26 (Selya, J., dissenting). The dissent further as
serted that the case that the majority relied upon, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38
(1976), was distinguishable. See id. at 25-26 (Selya, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 21-22. The majority discussed Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204 (1981), Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), and United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38 (1976). See supra Part 1.B.1 for a discussion of Santana; supra Part 1.B.2 for a
discussion of Payton; and supra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of Steagald.
198. Joyce, 112 F.3d at 21-22 (citing Steagald, 451 U.S. at 212-13).
199. See id. at 22 (citing Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213-14).
200. See id. (citing Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43).
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of "hot pursuit," because in Santana, the suspect's first contact with
the police was outside the home, with the suspect subsequently re
treating into her house. 201 Thus, she argued, to uphold the entry
into the Joyce home under Santana "creates a slippery slope, al
lowing the police to enter without a search warrant if the police
merely suspect that the person sought is inside the house."202 Sec
ond, Joyce argued that Welsh v. Wisconsin 203 held that a finding of
exigent circumstances requires a felony, and that the offense listed
on Lance's arrest warrant, a violation of a restraining order, was not
a felony under Massachusetts law. 204
The court rejected Joyce's arguments. The court stated that
Santana's "hot pursuit" exigency is not limited to cases in which the
suspect was first in a public place.20s In addition, the court stated
that while the law of Massachusetts does not categorize Lance's of
fense as a felony, "violations of protective orders are among the
more grave offenses affecting our society.''206 Furthermore, the
201.
202.

See id. See supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of Santana.
Joyce, 112 F.3d at 22.
466 U.S. 740 (1984). In Welsh, the Court stated that "minor offense[s]" are

203.
not the proper situation in which to apply the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement. See id. at 750. Thus, "[w]hen the government's interest is only to
arrest for a minor offense, [the] presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut,
and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant
issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate." Id. The Court elab
orated, stating that its decision in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-90 (1980),
which allowed warrantless home arrests where there is sufficient probable cause or exi
gent circumstances, was limited to felony arrests. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 n.11. See
supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of Santana's "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant
requirement and supra note 5 for a list and discussion of exigent circumstances
generally.
204. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 21. While Joyce based her argument upon the Welsh
decision, three other considerations also came into play: (1) the Supreme Court has
phrased the "hot pursuit" exigency as "hot pursuit of a fleeing felon," Vale v. Louisiana,
399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970) (emphasis added); (2) although expressing the exigency in terms
of the need to prevent harm to police officers and the public and the danger of escape,
the Supreme Court in Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99
(1967), found it significant that the suspect in that case was a suspected felon; and (3)
the dissenters in Payton recognized the importance of a felony limitation on the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 616-17
(White, J., dissenting).
205. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 22.
206. Id. The reason that the court characterized Lance's offense as a non-minor
offense, even though it was clearly not a felony, is unclear. However, it is relevant that
the Supreme Court has said that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement should be applicable only in cases that involve felonies and non-minor
offenses. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 ("Application of the exigent-circumstances excep
tion in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable
cause to believe that only a minor offense ... has been committed."); Payton, 445 U.S.
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court noted that had it decided the case under the exigent circum
stances exception to the warrant requirement, certain circum
stances, for example "inadequacy in the opportunity afforded for a
peaceable surrender" and nighttime entry, could undermine the ex
igency showing. 207
Ultimately, the court held that the doctrine of qualified immu
nity protected the officers because they acted reasonably.208 The
court reasoned that the law in this area is unsettled. 209 The major
ity defined "unsettled" as not "reasonably well-established."210 In
elaborating upon its interpretation of the phrase unsettled, the
court noted that "[t]he Supreme Court cases, with Steagald at one
pole and Santana at the other, do not definitively resolve our own
case."211 The officers had no notice that their entry without a
search was unlawful.2 12 It was, therefore, entirely appropriate to
leave the Fourth Amendment issue to be resolved in a case in which
the facts were clearer and the issue more decisive-essentially,
where qualified immunity would not apply.213
2.

Concurring Opinions

Chief Judge Torruella, while joining in the majority's ultimate
at 616-17 (White, J., dissenting) (recognizing the importance of the felony limitation on
arrests involving exigent circumstances); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459
(1948) (stating that "the gravity of the offense" is to be considered in determining
whether the exigent circumstances should apply). Although the court described
Lance's offense as a "grave offense[ ]," it recognized that if the offense had been trivial
or the arrest had not already been in progress, the outcome of the case could be differ
ent. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 22.
207. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 22.
208. See id. at 23. In determining whether the officers were protected, the court
noted that the officers were "entitled to qualified immunity [so long as] their decision
was reasonable, even if mistaken." [d. (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229
(1991)). The court held that the officers' actions were reasonable because the law was
not so clear as to put them on notice that without a search warrant their entry was
unlawful. See id. See also supra Part I.C.2 for a discussion of qualified immunity.
209. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 23.
210. See id. at 22-23.
211. [d. at 22. Furthermore, the court stated that "there is no settled answer as to
the constitutionality of doorway arrests." [d. See infra note 258 for a brief discussion
of the constitutionality of doorway arrests.
212. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 23.
213. See id. Although the court did not decide this case under a Fourth Amend
ment analysis, several members of the court appeared to be of the opinion that the
officers' entry would probably not pass constitutional muster. See id. In other words,
notwithstanding the fact that the law was unclear, if the Supreme Court were to review
the case it could find that the officers had violated the Joyces' Fourth Amendment
rights by failing to obtain a search warrant before approaching and entering the Joyce
home, as Steagald requires. See id.
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conclusion, wrote separately to emphasize the reasonableness stan
dard of the Fourth Amendment.214 In determining the validity of
the entry at issue, Judge Torruella found it reasonable for officers
who are directly opposite an arrestee, albeit separated by a screen
door, who refuses to cooperate, to follow the suspect into the
home.215 Judge Torruella found it significant that the officers did
not enter an unrelated third party's home. 216 Because the judge
viewed the police conduct as reasonable,217 he classified the situa
tion as one of "hot pursuit" as described in United States v.
Santana. 218
Judge Lynch, while concurring with the majority, did so merely
because of the irresolute state of Fourth Amendment law. 219 He
sympathized with Joyce and stated that she presented "very strong
arguments that the police violated the Fourth Amendment. "220
Judge Lynch determined, however, that given the uncertain state of
Fourth Amendment law on the legality of entry into a third party's
home, the officers were not unreasonable in their interpretation of
the law. 221 Specifically, Judge Lynch stated "[t]hat the judges of this
court so strongly disagree about whether there was a Fourth
Amendment violation means that the law in this area is not so
clearly established as to make the officers' action objectively unrea
sonable."222 Thus, Judge Lynch concluded that the officers' actions
214. See id. at 24 (Torruella, c.J., concurring). This reasonableness standard has
been emphasized on other occasions as well. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 620 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that "[o]ur cases establish that the ulti
mate test under the Fourth Amendment is one of 'reasonableness"') (citing Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1978»; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
539 (1967) (stating that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness).
See supra note 48 for additional cases supporting the proposition that warrantless
searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable.
215. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 24 (Torruella, c.J., concurring). '
216. See id. (Torruella, C.J., concurring). Had the officers entered an unrelated
third party's home, Judge Torruella noted tl1at the officers' conduct would clearly vio
late Steagald and make the search unreasonable. See id. (Torruella, C.J., concurring).
Although Steagald did not limit its holding to unrelated third parties' homes, but rather
held that an arrest warrant was insufficient to secure the privacy interests in the home
of a third party, Judge Torruella considered that Lance's familial relationship with the
third party made the case distinguishable from Steagald. See id. (Torruella, C.J., con
curring); see also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 214 n.7 (1981).
217. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 24 (Torruella, C.J., concurring).
218. See id. (Torruella, C.J., concurring). See supra Part I.B.l for a discussion of
Santana.
219. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 24 (Lynch, J., concurring).
220. Id. (Lynch, J., concurring).
221. See id. (Lynch, J., concurring).
222. Id. (Lynch, J., concurring).
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were not unreasonable and qualified immunity protected the of
ficers from liability.223
3~

Dissenting Opinion

In dissent, Judge Selya, joined by Judge Stahl, asserted that it
was entirely inappropriate to decide this case under the defense of
qualified immunity.224 Judge Selya stated that "qualified immunity
does not shield violations of clearly established constitutional prin
ciples merely because the specific factual situation in which a viola
tion arises has novel features."225 Indeed, Judge Selya noted that
the "court not only denies the plaintiff her day in court but also
invites the proliferation of such incidents. . .. [Moreover,] we will
be seen as sanctioning that which we are unwilling to condemn."226
Judge Selya did not believe that the Fourth Amendment law appli
cable to the present issue was "unsettled" at the time of the officers'
entry.227 Rather, Judge Selya stated that Steagal~ and Santana
"clearly established" the law relevant to the present Fourth
Amendment determination. 228 Thus, Judge Selya asserted that this
case must be decided on the already established rules of Fourth
Amendment protection, rather than under the protective cover of
qualified immunity.229
Judge Selya concluded that the police in this case unquestiona
bly betrayed the rule established in Steagald by entering a third
party's home without consent, a search warrant, or exigent circum
stances. 230 No exigency existed, in Judge Selya's opinion, because
223. See id. (Lynch, J., concurring). Judge Lynch's conclusion that the officers'
conduct was reasonable rested on the standard of qualified immunity which provides
that officers will not be liable if the law governing their conduct was not "clearly estab
lished" at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. BOO,
818 (1982). See supra Part I.C.2 for a discussion of qualified immunity.
224. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 25 (Selya, J., dissenting).
225. [d. (Selya, J., dissenting). Judge Selya believed that the officers in this case
plainly violated established Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 26 (Selya, J.,
dissenting).
226. [d. (Selya, J., dissenting).
227. See id. at 25 (Selya, J., dissenting).
228. See id. at 25-26 (Selya, J., dissenting).
229. See id. (Selya, J., dissenting). Judge Selya noted that "'a general constitu
tional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the
specific [facts] in question, even though the very action in question has not previously
been held unlawful.'" [d. (Selya, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520
U.S. 259, 271 (1997».
230. See id. (Selya, J., dissenting). Judge Selya stated that "the police trans
gressed the clearly established rule laid down by the Steagald Court. The plaintiff, Jo
anne Joyce, was not herself a suspect. Yet the defendant officers entered her home
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the mere act of moving from one part of the house to another does
not constitute "hot pursuit" as described in Santana. 231 Judge Selya
noted that Santana's holding only represented "that when the po
lice confront a suspect whom they have probable cause to arrest in
a public place, and the suspect subsequently flees into her home,
they may pursue and arrest her."232 Judge Selya distinguished
Santana by observing that Lance was not in public when the police
first sought to arrest him; rather, he was inside the house with a
screen door separating himself from the officers. 233 The distinction
between a suspect who is first seen outside the home and the sus
pect who is within "makes every bit of difference. "234 According to
Judge Selya, "'the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the
entrance to the house."'235 Judge Selya believed that the majority's
holding drew no line at all. 236

III.

THE LAW GOVERNING POLICE OFFICERS' RIGHTS TO
ENTER THE HOME OF A THIRD PARTY WITHOUT A
SEARCH WARRANT IS SUFFICIENTLY "CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED" TO REMOVE THE SHIELD OF
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

In Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury ,237 determining whether the law
was "clearly established" at the time of the officers' entry involved
an examination of whether it is lawful, under the Fourth Amend
ment, for police officers to enter the home of a third party when the
suspect refuses to step outside to be arrested. Although Supreme
Court precedent does not definitively resolve the particular facts
presented in Joyce, the Court has laid down some fundamental
rules to guide the lower courts in resolving cases arising under the
Fourth Amendment. 238
In Joyce, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir
without her consent, without a search warrant, and in the absence of any exigent cir
cumstances." Id. at 25 (Selya, J., dissenting). See supra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of
Steagald.
231. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 25-26 (Selya, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 25 (Selya, J., dissenting).
233. See id. at 25-26 (Selya, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 26 (Selya, J., dissenting).
235. Id. (Selya, J., dissenting) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590
(1980». See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of Payton.
236. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 26 (Selya, J., dissenting).
237. 112 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 1997).
238. See supra Part I.B for a description of the Supreme Court precedent on the
issue of the Fourth Amendment and arrests.
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cuit determined that although there were strong arguments that the
police officers encroached upon the Joyces' privacy interests239 and
violated their Fourth Amendment rights, the officers were entitled
to qualified immunity.240 The majority stated that the police of
ficers, even if mistaken in their understanding of Fourth Amend
ment law, nevertheless acted reasonably, and thus were entitled to
qualified immunity protection.241 The court reasoned that Fourth
Amendment law has not drawn any bright lines so as to make it
clear to the officers that their actions were unreasonable. 242 The
majority concluded that uncertainty in the law and disagreement
among the members of the court warranted the decision to defer
the constitutional question until another day.243
The dissent stated that "seeking cover under the doctrine of
qualified immunity ... effectively condones an unconstitutional en
croacHment on the sanctity of the home."244 Accordingly, the dis
sent argued that the court should have decided the Fourth
Amendment question based on available precedent even though
the Supreme Court had not yet addressed the specific facts of Joyce.
This analysis explores the issue of whether the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit erred in granting qualified
immunity to the officers, specifically, whether the law was "clearly
239. "[T]he principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of pri
vacy ...." Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967); see also
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
protects individual privacy rights so long as they are legitimate expectations of privacy);
Ashdown, supra note 80 (providing an extensive discussion of privacy interests and
their relation to the Fourth Amendment).
240. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 23.
241. See id. The Court in Steagald warned of such defenses. In discussing the
argument offered by the Government (that there were existing remedies such as mo
tions to suppress and civil suits for damages so as to make a search warrant requirement
unnecessary), the Supreme Court noted that "a person seeking to recover civil damages
for the unjustified search of his home may possibly be thwarted if a good-faith [and
reasonable] defense to such unlawful conduct is recognized." Steagald v. United States,
451 U.S. 204, 216 n.9 (1981). Indeed, the holding in Joyce presents such a case-the
petitioners were left without a remedy because of what the court deemed the "reason
able" efforts of the police.
242. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 23.
243. See id. While the majority deemed the available precedent "unsettled," the
Supreme Court has, in fact, been rather clear in this area of law. In Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980), the Court stated that "the Fourth Amendment has
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house ... [and] that threshold may not reason
ably be crossed without a warrant." The Supreme Court has, time and again, inter
preted this phrase to mean that the doorway represents a clear line; a line recognized by
only the dissent in Joyce. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 26 (Selya, J., dissenting); see also Stea
gald, 451 U.S. at 212.
244. Joyce, 112 F.3d at 24-25 (Selya, J., dissenting).
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established" at the time of the alleged misconduct in Joyce. This
analysis argues that Fourth Amendment law, with respect to police
entry into a third party's home to effectuate an arrest of their sus
pect, was "clearly established." Therefore, this analysis concludes
that the police were not entitled to the protective shield of qualified
immunity. Finally, this analysis asserts that there is a danger in
avoiding the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim: by not resolving
the merits, the First Circuit leaves the door open for future police
misconduct.
A.

Substantive Fourth Amendment Law Was "Clearly
Established"

Because the first step in a § 1983 case involving a qualified im
munity defense is to determine whether the law was "clearly estab
lished" at the time of the alleged misconduct, it is necessary to first
examine the relevant precedent on the Fourth Amendment issues
presented in the case. This section will demonstrate that the
Supreme Court has drawn some bright lines in the area of Fourth
Amendment law truly relevant to the issue in Joyce. This analysis is
comprised of two key issues: (1) the warrant requirement and the
protections it affords and (2) the lawfulness of arrests when exigent
circumstances are present.
1.

The Warrant Requirement and Privacy Interests

The Supreme Court has interpreted the language of the Fourth
Amendment's second clause, the Warrant Clause,245 which does not
require a warrant in all instances,246 to mean that law enforcement
officers must obtain a warrant unless the circumstances of the case
fall into one of the categorically defined exceptions. 247 1\vo types
of warrants exist to protect individual liberty and privacy inter
ests.248 The arrest warrant protects the liberty interests of the per
245. See supra Part 1.A.2 for a discussion of the Warrant Clause and the warrant
requirement.
246. See supra note 4 for a description of the exceptions to the warrant require
ment. In cases where police officers must obtain a warrant, the Fourth Amendment
requires that a "neutral and detached" magistrate or judge issue warrants only where
probable cause exists. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
247. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) ("[A] search or
seizure ... without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless ... it falls within one of a
carefully defined set of exceptions •..."). See supra note 4 for a description of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
248. See supra Part 1.A.2 for a discussion of the two types of warrants.
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son named in the warrant. 249 The search warrant protects the
. privacy interests of the owners of the premises or property named
in the warrant. 250 The Supreme Court has made it clear that an
arrest warrant, while adequately safeguarding a suspect's liberty in
terests protected under the Fourth Amendment, does nothing to
protect the privacy interests of other persons not named in the war
rant. 251 In Steagald v. United States ,252 the Supreme Court posi
tively ensured the privacy interests of third parties by holding that a
search warrant is necessary to adequately safeguard those privacy
interests: 253
[While] an arrest warrant authorizes the police to deprive a per
son of his liberty . . . [and] also authorizes a limited invasion of
that person's privacy interest ... in his home[, such a conclusion]
is plainly inapplicable when the police seek to use an arrest war
rant as legal authority to enter the horne of a third party to [exe
cute an arrest]. . . . Because [an arrest warrant] does not
authorize the police to deprive the third person of his liberty, it
cannot embody any derivative authority to deprive this person of
his interest in the privacy of his home. 254

As Steagald elucidates, at the time of the alleged violation in Joyce,
the law "clearly established" that a search warrant is necessary to
protect third parties' privacy interests.
As was the case in Steagald, the officers in Joyce entered the
Joyces' home to effect the arrest of the Joyces' son Lance, who did
not reside in the home. 255 When the officers knocked on the
249. See supra note 62 and accompanying text for the proposition that an arrest
warrant protects individual liberty interests.
250. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text for the proposition that search
warrants protect privacy interests.
251. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-16 (1981). Indeed, the Stea
gald Court, in discussing the officers' belief that Ricky Lyons was inside Steagald's
home, noted that:
Regardless of how reasonable [the] belief [that the subject of their arrest was
in Steagald's home] might have been, it was never subjected to the detached
scrutiny of a judicial officer. Thus, while the [arrest] warrant in this case may
have protected Lyons from an unreasonable seizure, it did absolutely nothing
to protect petitioner's privacy interest in being free from an unreasonable in
vasion ....
[d. at 213. See supra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of Steagald.
252. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
253. See id. at 213-14. See supra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of Steagald.
254. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 214 n.7.
255. See Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 112 F.3d 19, 20 (1st Cir. 1997). Although
Lance did not reside in the home, he was an overnight guest at his parents' house on the
night of August 6,1989. See Appellants' Brief at 4, Joyce (No. 95-1814). Lance's over
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door256 and Lance answered it, a screen door separated Lance from
night stay was not planned, but rather due to the fact that the family had assisted
Lance's brother, Dean Joyce, in the installation of kitchen cabinets at Dean's home.
See id. After a long day of hard work, the family returned to the Joyce home and Lance
agreed to spend the night so that Lance's father would not need to drive him home at
the late hour. See id.
One could ·argue that Lance's status as an overnight guest makes a difference in the
legality of the police officers' entry into the Joyce home. For example, Minnesota v.
Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), established that a suspect's lengthy stay in another's home
may give the suspect an expectation of privacy in the home, and therefore, the court
may consider the host's home as the suspect's "home" for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement. See id. at 96-100. Specifically, Olson held that a
suspect may challenge police entry into a third party's home, under the principles of
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), if the police did not have an arrest warrant for
the suspect. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 100; see also United States v. Romanelli, No. 98
50046,1998 WL 822730, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 1998) (holding that an overnight guest
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a locked box in which defendant places some
personal papers, and thus has standing to challenge an allegedly unlawful search);
United States v. Elliot, No. 3:93 CR 98, 1993 WL 366454, at *4-6 (D. Conn. Sept. 9,
1993) (holding that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
host's home and can therefore challenge his arrest and a search of the premises), affd,
50 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Sissler, No. 91-2113, 1992 WL 126974, at *3
(6th Cir. June 10, 1992) (holding that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the entire premises, and thus has standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the search); United States v. Osorio, 949 F.2d 38, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1991) (reviewing
Olson and concluding that overnight guests have an expectation of privacy in their
host's home and therefore are entitled to Fourth Amendment protection); Matthew
Frank, A Guest's Legitimate Expectation of Privacy: A Case Analysis of Minnesota v.
Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1687 (1990),14 HAMLINE L. REv. 231, 231-48, 251-55 (1990) (discuss
ing Olson and providing a thoughtful analysis of how Olson impacts a host's Fourth
Amendment rights). However, the overnight guest question is inapplicable to the issue
of whether qualified immunity was appropriate in Joyce, because the facts of Joyce oc
curred in 1989, prior to the Supreme Court's 1990 Olson decision. Thus, Lance's status
as an overnight guest is beyond the scope of this Note. For further reading on the
overnight guest issue, see Jones, supra note 80, at 957-65 (discussing an overnight
guest's legitimate expectation of privacy as essentially a standing issue).
256. Generally, police officers approaching a house to either arrest an occupant
or search the premises must knock on the door and announce their presence. See gener
ally Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). In Wilson, the Supreme Court adopted
the common law "knock and announce rule," which requires police officers to knock at
a dwelling and announce their purpose before forcibly entering the premises. See id. at
934. The Court in Wilson also stated that an unannounced entry may be permissible in
some circumstances where "law enforcement interests ... establish the reasonableness
of an unannounced entry." Id. at 936. Federal law enforcement officers are subject to a
similar "knock and announce rule," which is codified in 18 U.S.c. § 3109 (1994). See
United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409, 1417 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting the federal
law).
In Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997), the Supreme Court held that
although the states may not adopt a blanket exception to the "knock and announce
rule," an unannounced entry may be permissible where police can demonstrate "a rea
sonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular
circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective inves
tigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence." Richards,
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the officers, and he was completely inside the house.257 Lance did
not submit to his arrest before the police officers entered the Joyce
home,258 and therefore, did not waive his privacy interests. 259 More
520 U.S. at 394; see also United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 243-44 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that exigency and fear for the safety of officers and others in neighborhood
justified unannounced entry); United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 882 (4th Cir.
1994) (holding that exigency of prevention of destruction of evidence justified unan
nounced entry); United States v. Stiver, 9 F.3d 298, 301-02 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that
exigent circumstances justified unannounced entry).
257. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 20. The fact that Lance was completely within the
home, separated from the officers by a screen door, may raise the interesting issue of
the constitutionality of doorway arrests. A doorway arrest occurs when police officers
approach a house, knock on the door, and seek to arrest the suspect without a warrant
by convincing the suspect to submit to the officers' authority. See, e.g., United States v.
Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1379-80 (7th Cir. 1991). Although the Supreme Court has
not definitively resolved the issue of the constitutionality of doorway arrests, the United
States Courts of Appeals that have dealt with the issue generally agree that the issue
centers on whether the suspect voluntarily surrenders his Fourth Amendment privacy
interests. See id. at 1388 (stating that "if police go to a person's home to arrest him, and
have reason to believe they may have to enter the home to make the arrest, they should
obtain a warrant"); United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 1990) (ex
tending Payton v. New York to guestrooms in commercial establishments and holding
that a suspect does not consent to police officers' entry by partially opening his door to
determine who is knocking, nor does the suspect relinquish his expectation of privacy in
doing so); Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that the door
way may be a public place if the suspect has voluntarily come to stand in the doorway,
but that a suspect "who is compelled to stand in a doorway cannot be lawfully arrested
without the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances"); United States v.
George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1414 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that doorway arrests in which
the officers do not, in good faith, observe the warrant requirement are invalid); United
States v. Herrold, 772 F. Supp.1483, 1489-90 (M.D. Pa.1991) (discussing Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) and United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), and conclud
ing that "[l]aw enforcement officers may not circumvent [Payton's] arrest warrant re
quirement by simply summoning a suspect to the doorway of the suspect's home in
order to effect an arrest in a 'public place"'). While the majority in Joyce stated that
"there is no settled answer as to the constitutionality of doorway arrests," Joyce, 112
F.3d at 22, the cases addressing doorway arrests primarily involve situations in which
arresting officers have approached a suspect's home to arrest the suspect without an
arrest warrant. Thus, while an interesting question for courts to consider, courts have
not applied these principles when police seek to arrest a' suspect, for whom they have an
arrest warrant, in a third party's home, for which they do not have a search warrant.
Given that the courts have not applied the issue of the constitutionality of doorway
arrests to arrests in third party homes, the issue is beyond the scope of this Note. For
further reading, see Murray, supra note 93, at 142-44 (providing a brief discussion of
how Payton applies to the constitutionality of doorway arrests, as well as several cases
relating to doorway arrests and the expectation of privacy rationale). See also David
Orlin et aI., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 85 GEO. L.J. 847, 861 n.148 (1997) (dis
cussing cases in which courts have addressed the constitutionality of doorway arrests).
See infra note 260 for further discussion of the implications of the doorway arrest in
Joyce.
258. The officers claimed that Lance's refusal to exit the home once they an
nounced the existence of the arrest warrant for him prompted their entrance, and there
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importantly, however, 'Lance could not have waived his parents'
privacy interests in their home. Steagald made it perfectly clear
that a search warrant is the only method of ensuring the Joyces'
privacy interests. Certainly Steagald should have alerted the of
ficers that the law in this area was "clearly established,"260 thereby
alerting them that their actions were unconstitutionaP61 and mak
ing the defense of qualified immunity unavailable. 262 However, the
officers, in attempting to arrest Lance within a home he did not
reside in, violated the clear holding of Steagald, which unequivo
fore entry was proper under Santana's "hot pursuit" exception. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at
22. See infra Part III.A.2 for the proposition that "hot pursuit" is inapplicable to the
facts of Joyce.
259. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 21. The fact that Lance did not surrender to his arrest
when he opened the door to the officers' knock, and therefore arguably did not surren
der his privacy interests, is generally the primary issue involved in a doorway arrest
situation. As in the more typical doorway arrest situation, one could argue that Lance,
summoned to the door by the officers' knock, did not "come to stand in the doorway
voluntarily." Duncan, 869 F.2d at 1102; see also McCraw, 920 F.2d at 228, 229 (holding
that an individual does not "voluntarily expose himself to the public" by partially open
ing the door to determine the identity of the person knocking); Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at
1388 (stating that "there is a significant difference between a person who for no reason
voluntarily decides to stand in his open doorway, and a person who merely answers a
knock on his door. The person who answers the knock and stays within the house is not
voluntarily exposing himself 'to public view ... as if [he is] standing completely outside
[his] house''') (citation omitted). Thus, should courts eventually apply doorway arrest
principles to arrests in third party homes, one could argue that Lance was not exposed
"to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if [he was] standing completely outside
[his] home." United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976).
260. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). See supra notes 139-46
and accompanying text for a discussion of Harlow. In Harlow, the Supreme Court
stated that "whether [the] law was clearly established at the time an action occurred"
determines whether qualified immunity applies. Harlow, 451 U.S. at 818; see also
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984) (defining the "clearly established"
standard of Harlow as "whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known
that the search was illegal").
261. The officers' conduct was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment in
that they did not have the requisite search warrant. See Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 222 (1981).
262. But see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). The Court in Anderson
stated the following:
It ... does not follow immediately from the conclusion that it was firmly estab
lished that warrantless searches not supported by probable cause and exigent
circumstances violate the Fourth Amendment that [the officer's] search was
objectively legally unreasonable. We have recognized that ... law enforce
ment officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that
[their actions were legal].
Id. at 641. The Court went on to state that "we have been unwilling to complicate
qualified immunity analysis by making the scope or extent of immunity tum on the
precise nature of various officials' duties or the precise character of the particular rights
alleged to have been violated." Id. at 643.
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cally requires that police obtain a search warrant before approach
ing a third party's home to arrest a suspect for whom they have an
arrest warrant,263 Notwithstanding Steagald's clear and unambigu
ous search warrant requirement, the Joyce court determined that
the law was not "clearly established" and that the officers' actions
were reasonable under the doctrine of qualified immunity.264
While the Joyce court did not formally discuss the different in
terests protected by arrest warrants and search warrants,265 the
court apparently did not consider Steagald's search warrant require
ment as "clearly established" law. This reasoning contradicts the
Supreme Court's explicit language that the police may not enter a
third party's home without a search warrant. . The majority's hold
ing essentially places a determination reserved for the magis
trate 266-whether an object is located in a particular place-in the
hands of police officers in situations where they have an arrest war
rant and must enter a third party's home to complete the arrest.
The Steagald Court warned that leaving this sort of determination
to law enforcement officers "create[s] a significant potential for
abuse," because the police could then use an arrest warrant to
search the homes of all the suspect's friends and acquaintances. 267
In sanctioning the officers' entry under the shield of qualified im
munity, the Joyce court failed to heed the Supreme Court's warning
that an arrest warrant for Lance was insufficient to secure the
Joyces' privacy interests.
2.

Exigent Circumstances: "Hot Pursuit"?

While the Joyce court did not ultimately decide this case under
the Fourth Amendment, it discussed the plausibility of resolving it
under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant require
ment. 268 In so doing, the court contemplated that the police pursu
263. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213-14, 222.
264. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 23.
265. See id. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of
arrest warrants and search warrants and the types of interests they each seek to protect.
266. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 214 n.7 (stating that "the magistrate, rather than the
police officer, must make the decision that probable cause exists to believe that the
person or object to be seized is within a particular place"); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (stating that Fourth Amendment protection requires that "the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence ... [must] be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime").
267. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 215.
268. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 22. The police officers in Joyce claimed that Lance's
refusal to exit the home once they announced the existence of his arrest warrant
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ance of Lance Joyce could be considered "hot pursuit" as described
in Santana. 269 Although Santana involved a suspect fleeing from
the outside of her house to the inside to prevent arrest, the Joyce
court stated that "Santana's exception likely does not tum on
whether the individual is standing immediately outside or immedi
ately inside the house when the police first confront him and at
tempt an arrest."270 The court declared that Lance's position
inside or outside the house-was not the decisive factor in deter
mining the applicability of Santana's "hot pursuit" exception.271
Rather, the court considered Santana's "hot pursuit" exigency to
apply in any situation in which the suspect knows of the police of
ficers' intention to arrest him and then attempts to thwart arrest. 272
The First Circuit's interpretation of Santana does not coincide with
the fact that the Santana Court evidently based its decision on
United States v. Watson,273 which held that no warrant is necessary
to arrest a suspect who is in a public place, so long as there is prob
able cause. 274 In addition, the Joyce court's view is inconsistent
with the prevailing interpretation of the "hot pursuit" exigency es
tablished in Santana. 275 Such an interpretation of Santana is overly
prompted their entrance into the Joyce home. See id. The officers argued that their
entry was proper under Santana's "hot pursuit" exception. See id. See supra note 5 for
a description of exigent circumstances.
269. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 22. Santana established that the retreat of a suspect
into her home, after seeing the police approaching, could not defeat a proper arrest;
such circumstances were deemed "hot pursuit," falling under the exigent circumstances
exception. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976). See supra Part LB.1
for a discussion of Santana.
270. Joyce, 112 F.3d at 22.
271. See id.
272. Remarkably, the Court in Santana stated that "[o]nce Santana saw the po
lice, there was ... a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of
evidence." Santana, 427 U.S. at 43 (emphasis added). Therefore, although Santana
classified the case as one of "hot pursuit," the hot pursuit exigency also considers the
fact that Santana might destroy evidence if police did not arrest her immediately. See
id. See supra note 5 for the proposition that destruction of evidence is an exigent cir
cumstance. The need to prevent the destruction of evidence is one of the principal
rationales of the "hot pursuit" exigency. See generally Santana, 427 U.S. at 43. Thus, if
the First Circuit was relying on Lance's recognition that the police were there to arrest
him in order to construct their theory that the location of the arrestee is irrelevant to
Santana's "hot pursuit" exception, their reliance is ironic, since there is no evidence
associated with the violation of a restraining order, and therefore no evidence for Lance
to destroy. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 22.
273. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
274. See id. at 424-28.
275. See United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating
that "the question presented in this case is not decided only on the basis of whether
Vaneaton was standing inside or outside the threshold of his room, but whether he
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broad and not one likely contemplated by the Santana Court.276
Although the majority in Joyce ultimately decided the case on
qualified immunity grounds, it considered the "hot pursuit" excep
tion plausible. The facts of this case, however, simply do not pres
ent a situation involving the "hot pursuit of a fleeing felon. "277 As
the dissent in Joyce observed, "the mere fact that Lance Joyce,
prompted by police action, moved from one part of his mother's
home to another did not create any cognizable exigency."278 The
Supreme Court has stated that in order for there to be a finding of
"hot pursuit," there must be some sort of chase. 279 In Joyce, there
'voluntarily exposed himself to warrantless arrest"') (citation omitted); United States v.
McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Santana . .. is distinguishable from the
present case in that the arrestee in the present case was not standing on the threshold of
the doorway at the time the agents arrived. Instead, Mathis came to the door in re
sponse to the agents' knocking."); see also United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757
(9th Cir. 1980) (stating that "it is the location of the arrested person, and not the arrest
ing agents, that determines whether an arrest occurs within a home"), affd, 457 U.S.
537 (1982); cf. McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934, 935-36 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that
"the suspect was visible, standing in the threshold of his doorway, open to public
view.... The officers had knocked, identified themselves ... and petitioner had opened
the door").
276. See supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of Santana. The Supreme Court's hold
ing in Santana reads: "[w]e thus conclude that a suspect may not defeat an arrest which
has been set in motion in a public place, and is therefore proper under WaLl'on, by the
expedient of escaping to a private place." Santana, 427 U.S. at 43.
277. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin 466
U.S. 740, 742 (1984). In Welsh, the suspect swerved off the road and landed in an open
field, whereupon he got out of the car and walked away from the scene. See id. at 742.
A short while later, police arrived at the scene, checked the registration of the vehicle,
and proceeded to the suspect's home. See id. Without obtaining a warrant of any kind,
the police entered the suspect's home and arrested him for driving while intoxicated.
See id. at 743. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that exigent circumstances, specif
ically "hot pursuit," the need to prevent physical harm to the public, and the destruction
of evidence (suspect's blood alcohol level) justified the entry. See id. at 747-48. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that no exigent circumstances
including "hot pursuit" were present, because the nature of the underlying offense was
"minor," and the gravity of the offense is to be considered in determining if an exigency
exists. See id. at 750, 753. In addition, the Court stated that "the claim of hot pursuit is
unconvincing because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit ... from the scene
of a crime." [d. at 753. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the facts of Joyce. See
supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of Judge Torruella's concurrence, in which he stated
that he believed the case fell under the "hot pursuit" exigency exception.
278. Joyce, 112 F.3d at 25 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
279. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). In Johnson, the Court
stated "we find no element of 'hot pursuit' in the arrest of one who was not in flight."
[d. at 16 n.7. Moreover, the Santana Court reiterated this point: "[I]n Johnson v.
United States . .. it was recognized that some element of a chase will usually be involved
in a 'hot pursuit' case." Santana, 427 U.S. at 43 n.3 (citation omitted); see also Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that searching
for a suspected felon within minutes of a robbery constituted an exigency finding).
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was no chase. 28o Lance simply "withdrew from the doorway."281
One could argue that if an exigency situation existed, Officers
Donovan and Budryk actually created the exigency.282 Since Lance
was not in his own home, the officers knew they could not cross the
threshold of the house to effect their arrest without a search war
rant under Steagald v. United States. 283 Since suspects frequently
refuse to submit to arrest, the police officers' need to enter the
Joyce home was entirely predictable. Given this predictable out
come, by failing to obtain a search warrant in advance of arresting
Lance, the officers created the exigency-the need to follow him
into the house once he refused to come outside. Moreover, regard
less of whether the officers knew that Lance intended to stay at the
Joyce home overnight, the officers received their tip about Lance's
whereabouts. "earlier in the evening"284 and did not endeavor to
arrest Lance until "[l]ate [in] the evening,"285 at approximately
11:30 p.m. 286 The officers therefore had ample time to obtain a
search warrant before approaching the premises. Viewed in this
light, it appears that the officers relied on a self-created exigency in
order to enter the house to arrest Lance. This sort of self-created
exigency demonstrates the officers' apparent inattention to the war
rant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 287
Instead of relying on a self-created exigency, police officers
280. See supra note 79 for a description of "hot pursuit" and the relevance of
"chase."
281. Joyce, 112 F.3d at 20.
282. Police officers may not, in effecting an arrest, create their own exigency. See
United States.v. Blount, 123 F.3d 831, 838 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he prosecution may not
rely upon an exigency that the police themselves created ...."), cert. denied by Johnson
v. United States, 118 S. €t. 895 and by Blount v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1101 (1998);
United States v. Johnson, 12 F.3d 760, 764-65 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that the exigent
circumstances must arise from something outside of the officers' control, and thus,
"[t]he police themselves ... cannot create the exigency"); United States v. McCraw, 920
F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that the exigency "was precipitated by the agents'
themselves when they knocked on the door"); see also United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d
1278, 1284-85 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence obtained through an exigency cre
ated by the police must be suppressed).
283. 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981).
284. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 20.
285. See id.
286. See Appellants' Brief at 4, Joyce (No. 95-1814).
287. Courts have admonished police officers whose self-created exigency demon
strated a lack of good faith in observing the warrant requirement for arrests in resi
dences. See McCraw, 920 F.2d at 230; United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1414-15
(9th Cir. 1989). But cf. United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187, 192 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure of defendant's resi
dence while a search warrant was being procured).
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could have arrested Lance in his own home under the principles of
Payton v. New York.28 8 Alternatively, the officers could have
waited patiently outside the Joyce residence and arrested Lance
when he left. 289 Indeed, the SteagaLd Court recognized this possi
bility,290 and stated that "in most situations the police may avoid
altogether the need to obtain a search warrant simply by waiting for
a suspect to leave the third person's home before attempting to
arrest that suspect."291 Rather than employing either of these two
options, the police went to the Joyce home to arrest Lance, thereby
producing what the court in Joyce considered could constitute an
exigent circumstance. 292
If the court in Joyce had characterized the case as one of "hot
pursuit," not only would it have inaccurately expanded the scope of
that exigency, it would have demonstrated to law enforcement of
ficers that a mere shuffle of the feet can create such an exigency.293
L;mce's withdrawal from the screen door can hardly constitute a
chase rising to the level of "hot pursuit." It is questionable whether
a'finding to the contrary would leave the Fourth Amendment's exi
gency exception intact.

B. A Danger in Avoiding the Substantive Fourth Amendment
Issue?
When courts use qualified imniunity to shield law enforcement
officers from liability when those officers have violated the law,
there is a danger that courts are simply avoiding difficult substan
tive Fourth Amendment issues. 294 Although a court may deem the
288. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of Payton. Payton
held that police officers may enter the home of the subject of an arrest warrant to arrest
the suspect. See id. at 602-03. Since the police in Joyce had an arrest warrant for Lance,
they could have waited until Lance returned home to arrest him. Indeed, the Steagald
Court recognized that "the situation in which a search warrant will be necessary are few
[because] Payton [held that] an arrest warrant alone will suffice to enter a suspect's own
residence to effect his arrest." Steagald, 451 U.S. at 221.
289. Had the officers waited outside to arrest Lance, their arrest would clearly
have been valid under United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), which held that
warrantless arrests are valid if done in a public place. The fact that the arrest warrant
was outstanding indicates that the police had ample opportunity to choose either of
these two options for apprehending Lance. See id. at 415.
290. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 221. The Court stated that "the subject of an arrest
warrant can be readily seized before entering or after leaving the home a third party."
Id.
291. Id. at 221 n.14.
292. See Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 112 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1997).
293. See id.
294. The majority in Joyce recognized this possible danger. See id. at 23.
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available precedent "unsettled," such a determination not only
leaves the law unclear, but also disrupts the evolution of constitu
tionallaw. 295 If courts deciding § 1983 suits on the basis of quali
fied immunity were to tackle the difficult substantive law, then the
law would become "clearly established" so that officers presented
with similar factual scenarios in the future would not be able to
trample the rights of others. 296
By avoiding the merits of the Joyces' claim, the First Circuit
has in essence signaled to the law enforcement community that law
officials are effectively shielded from § 1983 damages suits.297 In
addition, although the Supreme Court has clearly held that police
officers must have a search warrant or exigent circumstances before
entering the home of a third party to execute an arrest warrant, the
Joyce holding, based on qualified immunity, excuses and even con
dones police misconduct. Such an endorsement makes it more
likely that officers in the future will feel free to infringe upon
others' constitutionally protected rights.
The Fourth Amendment protects individual liberty298 and pri
vacy interests,299 and the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement is necessary to preserve our
295. See John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for "Unnecessary" Con
stitutional Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 403,410
(1999). Greabe argues that courts should, notwithstanding that the defendants in a
§ 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity, resolve the underlying issues in dicta.
In support of this argument, Greabe states the following:
The requirement that the allegedly violated right be clearly established at the
time of the action in question tends, if not to "freeze" constitutional law, then
at least to retard its growth through civil rights damages actions. The corpus
of constitutional law grows only when courts address novel constitutional
questions, yet a novel claim, by definition, seeks to establish a right that is not
already "clearly established."
Id. Although Greabe recognizes that dicta does not carry as much precedential weight
as holdings, see id. at 421, he argues that courts would increase the corpus of constitu
tionallaw if they were to address the merits of constitutional claims, so as to notify state
officials whether untested conduct is constitutional, as well as deter future unconstitu
tional conduct. See id. at 433.
296. See id. at 410.
297. See id. at 407 (arguing that "officials whose unconstitutional conduct already
has been challenged in court should not be permitted, indeed encouraged, to repeat
their unlawful conduct without accountability").
298. See supra note 62 and accompanying text for the proposition that arrest war
rants protect individual liberty interests.
299. See supra note 80 for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects
legitimate expectations of privacy; supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text for the
proposition that search warrants protect privacy interests.
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Fourth Amendment protections. 30o The Fourth Amendment pro
tects every American citizen from "unreasonable searches and
seizures,"301 and the search warrant requirement serves to protect
individuals from governmental encroachment upon their privacy in
terests. 302 Such a protection is implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, is essential to the American notion of freedom, and has be
come a touchstone in American jurisprudence.303
In deciding the case under the protection of qualified immu
nity, and thus avoiding the Fourth Amendment issue, the majority
in Joyce effectively dismisses the importance of the Fourth Amend
ment's history and its protections. The Framers enacted the Fourth
Amendment to protect the people of this country from the wide
spread abuses resulting from the use of general warrants. 304 This
motivating factor has shaped the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the amendment.305 However, assuming the officers' entry in Joyce
300. See generally Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) ("[T]he zone
of privacy [is most] clearly defined ... when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home .... Absent exigent circumstances, [the] threshold
[of the house] may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant."); Chambers v. Ma
roney, 399 U.S. 42, 61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(" 'The general requirement that a search warrant be obtained' is basic to the Amend
ment's protection of privacy ....") (citation omitted); see also Dorman v. United
States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Freedom from intrusion into the home or
dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amend
ment. ... [A] home may not be searched without a warrant notwithstanding probable
cause.") (footnotes omitted).
301. U.S. CaNST. amend IV. See supra note 1 for the complete text of the Fourth
Amendment.
302. See supra notes 62-64 for the proposition that arrest warrants protect liberty
interests and search warrants protect privacy interests.
303. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (explaining that the Fourth
Amendment was made applicable to the states through the Due Process Gause, and
stating that the freedoms guaranteed by the amendment are "basic to our free society"),
overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10,17 n.8 (1948) (quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
303 (1921), as stating that the rights secured by the Constitution are '''to be regarded as
of the very essence of constitutional liberty"').
304. See ANASTAPLO, supra note 38, at 69; LASSON supra note 32, at 51-53; cf.
Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 ("[T]he evil the Amendment was designed to prevent was
broader than the abuse of a general warrant. Unreasonable searches or seizures con
ducted without any warrant at all are condemned by the plain language of the first
clause of the Amendment."). See supra Part 1.A.1 for a discussion of the use of general
warrants, which led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.
305. See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 591-98 (tracing the history of the common law
relevant to the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment); Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582, 603-06 (1946) (reciting the experience of the Framers which led to the adop
tion of the Fourth Amendment); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-33 (1886)
(discussing the importance of the history of the Fourth Amendment to a determination
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was unlawful (a point the court did not decide), it appears that the
doctrine of qualified immunity tolerates the· abuses306 the Fourth
Amendment was designed to eradicate. 307
To effectively safeguard our constitutional rights, the Fourth
Amendment requires law enforcement officers to obtain either an
arrest warrant or a search warrant unless there is consent308 or exi
gent circumstances. 309 In order to preserve the integrity of the
Fourth Amendment, courts should continue to assess new factual
situations so that the body of law concerning the Fourth Amend
ment's warrant requirement develops, thus limiting the number of
situations in which the law is unclear. The holding in Joyce cer
tainly does not signal to the officers that they violated the Fourth
Amendment-nor does it set a precedent for officers in the future .
. Notwithstanding all of the available precedent, the First Circuit
concluded that the law was too uncertain for them to judge the
Fourth Amendment issue. 31o In failing to decide the Fourth
Amendment issue, the First Circuit has implicitly given the police
of its meaning). The Boyd Court noted that "[i]n order to ascertain the nature of the
proceedings intended by the fourth amendment to the constitution under the 'unrea
sonable searches and seizures,' it is only necessary to recalI the contemporary or then
recent history of the controversies on the subject, both in this country and England."
Id. at 624-25.
306. While general warrants no longer exist, abuse of the warrant process still
continues. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134-36 (1990) (quoting Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971), and stating that the "plain view" doc
trine does not apply where police are not lawfulIy present at the location of the search
and seizure); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (rejecting the claim of "hot
pursuit ... because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from
the scene of a crime" and therefore officers could not use exigent circumstances to
justify entry, without an arrest warrant, to arrest defendant for drunk driving).
307. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text for a description of the abuses
that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent.
308. When police officers seek to arrest a suspect in his home or search a sus~
pect's home, the suspect must consent to the police entry into his home in order for a
warrantless arrest or search to be lawful. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
248-49 (1973) (holding that where consent is voluntary, a search without a warrant is
constitutional). However, in cases in which police officers attempt to arrest a suspect in
a third party's home, the third party must consent to the officers' entry. See Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1981) ("[A] search warrant must be obtained ab~
sent exigent circumstances or consent ...."). In Joyce, the Joyces did not consent to the
officers entry into their home. See Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 112 F.3d 19, 20 (1st Cir.
1997).
309. See supra Part 1.A.2 for a discussion of the warrant process; see also Califor
nia v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,601 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "[e]ven if
the warrant requirement does inconvenience the police to some extent, that fact does
riot distinguish this constitutional requirement from any other procedural protection
secured by the Bill of Rights").
310. See Joyce, 112 F.3d at 22-23.
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force authority to conduct themselves in the same unlawful fashion
in the future without the threat of § 1983 damages liability. This
authority is greater than the Supreme Court has afforded in
Santana,311 Payton,312 and particularly Steagald. 313 The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in Joyce thus
not only muddies the waters of Fourth Amendment law, but in
creases the probability of future Fourth Amendment violations.
CONCLUSION

When courts permit law enforcement officers to pierce the pro
tective shield of the Fourth Amendment through the use of quali
fied immunity, the Fourth Amendment becomes an arbitrary and
useless principle. 314 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's
decision in Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury allowed such' a piercing of
the Fourth Amendment. The Joyce court's decision based on quali
fied immunity was incorrect given that Steagald v. United States un
equivocally requires police to obtain a search warrant before
entering a third party's home to arrest their suspect. The decision
in Joyce permits law enforcement officers to disregard the clear rule
311. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). In Santana, while ulti
mately holding that the arrest in that case was proper, the Court emphasized that
Santana had no expectation of privacy while standing in her doorway, since a doorway
is considered a public place for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 42.
312. See Payton v, New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), While holding that an arrest
warrant is necessary to arrest a suspect in his home, and recognizing that a search war
rant would afford greater protection, the Court stressed that an arrest warrant "will
suffice to interpose the magistrate's determination of probable cause between the zeal
ous officer and the citizen." [d. at 602.
313. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). In holding that a search
warrant is necessary to enter the home of a third party to effectuate an arrest, the
Steagald Court distinguished between the protections afforded by an arrest warrant and
the protections afforded by a search warrant. The Court stated:
[T]he [arrest] warrant [obtained by the police] embodied a judicial finding that
there was probable cause to believe that Ricky Lyons had committed a felony,
and the warrant therefore authorized the officers to seize Lyons. However,
the agents sought to do more than use the warrant to arrest Lyons in a public
place or in his home; instead, they relied on the warrant as legal authority to
enter the home of a third person based on their belief that Ricky Lyons might
be a guest there. Regardless of how reasonable this belief might have been, it
was never subjected to the detached scrutiny of a judicial officer. Thus, while
the [arrest] warrant ... may have protected Lyons from an unreasonable
seizure, it did absolutely nothing to protect petitioner's privacy interest in be
ing free from an unreasonable invasion and search of his home.
[d. at 213 (emphasis added).
314. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) ("Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own law, or worse, its disregard
of the charter of its own existence.").
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established by the Supreme Court in Steagald while remaining im
mune from suit. Even assuming that the law was unsettled when
the First Circuit decided Joyce, the First Circuit's avoidance of the
substantive Fourth Amendment law furthers the law's undefined
scope.
Heather Carey

